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The observed effects of the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 have been: a marginally increased number of
protests; dramatically improved decision times due to
shortened agency response deadlines and GAO dismissal of
spurious protests; and stays of award and termination of
contract performance. There is no evidence that the increase
in protests is related to increased complaints about
restrictive sole source contracting. The legislative impact
has been minimal at the field activity level where there is
a widespread perception that protests are increasing for
unjustified reasons. While personal experience may not
support this complaint, it has a legal merit since the
burden of proof has shifted entirely to the Government.
Unintended results of the statute may include: 1) improved
solicitation review to avoid situations vulnerable to
protest, and 2) added scrutiny, with concomitant delay, in
the source selection process to assess the defensibility of
the tentative source selection decision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF ISSUES
Among its various provisions, the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 1 Public Law (P.L.) 98-369
amended the Federal statute regarding contract award
protests, ostensibly for the purpose of increased
competition. Sufficient time has passed since enactment to
permit a preliminary assessment of the anticipated and
unanticipated impacts of the legislation. This research
concerned identification of the process related to award
protests; an assessment of how that process was altered by
CICA; and identification and analysis of trends relating to
contract award protest that can be linked to CICA. Such
trends were presumed to be indicators of the effectiveness
of the legislation.
The Comptroller General of the United States asserted
authority over bid protests 2 as a result of expansive
interpretations of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
[1:113]. Under his guidance, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) began to hear protests and established an
institutional structure to accommodate the function. At
^-Alternatively referred to as the Act.
2See Section F for a discussion of terminology award
protest and bid protest.
that time, it was the only recourse—administrative or
judicial—available for protests, ignoring a disused
nineteenth century practice of special Congressional relief
legislation. Over the next forty years, the award protest
system grew to include a judicial process as well as the GAO
administrative remedy.
In 1968, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business
found that "present procedures for handling (award) protests
are entirely inadequate and unsatisfactory [2:38]." The
1972 Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) similarly
concluded that the GAO bid protest procedures needed
"... improvement in the interest of greater fairness and
effectiveness [2:95;3:7]." COGP also found significant
dissatisfaction with the bid protest system "in procurement
literature, Congressional hearings," and its "study group
hearings [4:167]." The longstanding limitation whereby GAO
could only review and decide on the validity of contract
awards weakened its procedures. The Comptroller General not
only lacked authority to stop performance, or enjoin, the
successful contractor during the period that the protest was
decided, but also was unable to effect significant
corrective actions. What this meant was that when a
protester proved a valid case, the corrective actions
available to GAO were prejudiced because significant
contract execution had been accomplished by the time of the
finding [2:97]. Finally, the contracting agency could
choose to ignore the GAO recommendations. These limits were
exacerbated by an open-ended time scale for protests that
further muddled the process. An increasing number of bid
protests threatened "to destroy the value of the award
protest system by turning it into a device that potentially
could impede the overall efficient functioning of the
procurement process [3:97]."
Over a period of years, sufficient dissatisfaction
accumulated to compel legislative change. Criticism
appeared in literature published about Government
acquisition, as was summarized in the comprehensive 1972
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement [2,3,4].
A compromise set of recommendations taken from several
sources eventually became part of the CICA, although
intervening factors influenced the manner in which these
recommendations were implemented.
In a sweeping reform of Government procurement, CICA
focused on restoring competitive contracting to preeminence.
Among the methods employed in CICA to effect the desired
reversal from directed to competitive procurement were
provisions that formally empowered GAO to hear protests and
directed GAO to reformat its bid protest process. Thus,
CICA atrempred to enhance the GAO bid protest process nor
only to correct prior weakness but to aid in fundamental
restoration of greater competition to Government procurement
[5:5]. Now, if a competitive bidder has been wronged, he
presumably has the means to press his case and to have a
reasonable and fair opportunity for administrative remedy.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The general area of concern was an assessment of how
award protests relate to the integrated whole of Government
acquisition policy. Since award protest resolution power
resided institutionally with the GAO and procedures were
formally published for protester's use, there existed, de
facto, a GAO bid protest process. The specific problem was,
then, to determine the actual impact of CICA on the GAO bid
protest process by comparing the process before and after
enactment.
The first element of the problem was to define, in
general, the award protest system and, in specific, the bid
GAO protest process both before and after CICA.
The second element was to determine the actual CICA
changes regarding the process and their underlying intent.
This was considered important since the intent of the
Congress is seldom perfectly translated into the language of
the legislation and agencies have not always interpreted
matters precisely as the Congress wished.
The third element: of the problem was no locate and
quantify any observable functional measures of the bid
protest process. Such process measures provided a basis for
the comparison of trends before and after the Act. An
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attempt was made to impute reasons for the trends and to
establish, by deduction, underlying causes.
C. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
By virtue of timing, this study took an early, yet
comprehensive look at the results of CICA bid protest reform
from a perspective of whether the legislation met its
intended purpose. Based on answers to specific research
questions regarding the nature of the process and how it
functioned before and after CICA, it was possible to assess
whether, as intended, CICA corrected any supposed, pre-
existing problems of the award process system. To the
extent that the research objectives were met, the analysis
provided an indication of the effectiveness of the award
protest aspects of the CICA.
It was also possible to determine whether other,
unforeseen problems have resulted in consequence to the
statutory changes. Unintended consequences found were
suggested as the basis for further analysis and
recommendations
.
Finally, to the extent that the study analyzed the
effectiveness of the bid protest system, it was possible to
draw normative conclusions regarding the role of the protest
system in general government acquisition policy.
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question of the thesis was: What
has been the impact of the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984 on the bid protest process?
While additional subsidiary questions arose during the
research, specific questions were apparent at the outset,
including the following:
1. What precipitated the changes found in the CICA?
2. What were the primary objectives that could be found




What was the new bid protest process and to what
extent did it actually change from pre-CICA
procedures?
4 What were the principal management control standards
of the bid protest process and what changes did these
measures reflect?
5. To what extent were the new stay and termination
provisions being exercised?
6. Was the behavior of the principal entities involved in
the process changed as a consequence of CICA?
7. Have there been any unintended consequences of the
CICA bid protest modifications?
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The scope of this thesis was a comprehensive
examination of the GAO bid protest process, an element of an
overall award protest system, with an objective of
determining how that process operates before and after
enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.
12
The research focused initially on the broad range of GAO bid
protest activities.
Contracting field activity data and perceptions
provided a relevant second avenue to evaluate the bid
protest process from a perspective other than that of the
adjudicator, GAO. Because the scope of contracting agency
perspective was so broad, this aspect of the study was
restricted to the experiences of the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) as one Navy acquisition agency quite likely
to encounter a full range of contract values, contract
types, and contracting methods. These broad range dealings
qualified as a first approximation to relevant experience in
lieu of statistically significant sampling analysis. Five
NAVSUP field activities were selected: the two Inventory
Control Points (ICPs) and three continental United States
Navy Regional Contracting Centers (NRCCs) . These activities
were selected because of the volume of their transactions
and the range of their activities, in addition to the fact
that all were readily accessible and supportive.
Research regarding historical matters was
principally literature based, although supplemental
interviews were used when possible. Because these matters
are current, unpublished data and personal opinions were
crucial. These were sought by telephonic interview.
One of the provisions of CICA established a special
category for bid protests relating to automated data
13
processing (ADP) procurement. All ADP protests fall under
the jurisdiction of the General Services Administration
(GSA) Board of Contract Appeals. In that such protests are
special situations beyond the norm of routine Government
acquisition and notwithstanding ongoing controversy
regarding this provision, ADP protests were not considered
in this thesis.
2 . Limitations
The research matters were bounded fundamentally by
the element of time. CICA bid protest provisions became
effective 15 January 1985, so only slightly more than two
years had elapsed. Therefore, the post-CICA case data base
was finite, although large. Furthermore, data compilation
and publication lead times were nearly six months, so they
constrained the available data; for example, few fiscal year
(FY) 87 GAO cases had been published at the time of writing.
Given these constraints, this aspect of the research
focused on the time period FY 80 to FY 86 plus FY 87 as data
were available. This provided one partial and four full
years of pre-CICA experience and one full and two partial
years of post-CICA experience. Where data for additional
prior years were readily available, they were gathered as
well and proved useful in analysis of performance
statistics.
A second limitation was the volume of GAO case data.
The sheer number of cases prohibited a complete review
14
within the scope of this effort. The research therefore was
limited to Department of the Navy experience, although
contrasting data was used when readily available to
establish how the Navy experience generally correlated with
other Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian Government
agencies. To the extent that sustained outcomes could be
identified, they were analyzed.
A third limitation arose as a result of
implementation controversy. For reasons that will be
discussed later, the contracting agencies did not fully
comply with the contract stay provisions of CICA until
several months after actual enactment. This affected data
availability regarding stays and terminations in a limited
fashion.
3 . Assumptions
Two unstated assumptions of the CICA merit general
introductory comment. CICA assumed: 1) that a relatively
large body of dissatisfied bidders seeking recourse existed
as a result of flawed, pre-CICA Government regulations, and
2) that the changes contained in CICA would meet resistance
by the contracting agencies. These assumptions were
credible especially if one inferred either a bureaucratic
reticence to change or an outright unwillingness to use
competitive procurement techniques on the part of Government
procurement agencies. The two assumptions led one to infer
that the flawed, pre-CICA protest process suppressed some
15
number of protests. Thus, if the CICA provisions affecting
the protest process made protesting easier and the
probability of gaining satisfaction greater, dissatisfied
bidders would have been protesting more and distinct changes
should have been observable in the number of cases
submitted, the number heard, and quite likely, the number
sustained.
F. DEFINITIONS
- Award Protest/ Bid Protest—Although the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) used the term award protest:
exclusively, the term bid protest was often used
interchangeably in the literature. COGP noted that bid
protest was historically used, but that award protest
more accurately included the negotiated procurement
method which was more prevalent than the sealed bid
method [2:5]. Notwithstanding the subtle distinction,
the CICA language referred only to bid protests. Both
terms were used throughout the text without distinction,
unless specifically noted.
- Protest—Protest was used to mean a written objection by
an interested party to a solicitation by an agency for
offers for a proposed contract for the acquisition of
supplies or services or a written objection by an
interested party to a proposed award or award of such a
contract [6:33-1].
- Interested Party—An interested party was an actual or
prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would
have been affected by the award of, or failure to award
a particular contract [6:33-1].
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II details the study methodology, including a
discussion of relevant data sources.
Chapter III provides background and a theoretical basis
for understanding the award protest system and the GAO bid
16
protest process. It addresses how the bid protest process
worked prior to CICA, the alterations directed by the Act
—
both actual and desired, and the modified protest process
that results.
Chapter IV addresses research data and analysis
regarding the GAO bid protest process. It comprises both
GAO measures of bid protest process performance and some
agency specific information.
Chapter V presents the data and personnel opinions of
bid protest activity at the field activity level plus
analysis and interpretation.
Study results, conclusions, and recommendations are




The methods used herein are: 1) literature review,
2) data collection and analysis, and 3) selective personal
interviews. Source material included published materials;
published and unpublished GAO information; internal,
unpublished Navy data; interviews with GAO attorneys and
Navy field activity personnel; and Comptroller General
decisions.
Some of the research questions posed in Chapter I were
answered as a result of the literature search. Responses to
the remaining questions required specific data collection.
Data collection methods are described in this chapter.
Actual data and analyses are reserved for presentation in
Chapters IV and V. Interviews supplemented both the
literature and the data throughout.
B. LITERATURE RESEARCH
Literature research began with preliminary bibliographic
searches of the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
,
the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Library. These
bibliographic searches indicated that publication of primary
data and analytical materials was spotty, however,
significantly more data was found in secondary sources such
18
as the Federal Contract Report (FCR) which provided synopses
of GAO decisions and GAO summary performance statistics [7].
The literature offered a solid foundation for the
studies. The Federal Register and regulations published in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provided the basis for
comparative analysis of GAO bid protest procedures before
and after the Act. Sufficient summary sources were
available to permit analysis of the pre-CICA situation and
to adequately document Congressional intent. Good
statistical data also existed concerning post-CICA GAO
activity. Finally, there were several published analyses
written from a legal point of view that suggested further
reforms were needed.
Results of the literature search established the
background and theoretical framework presented in the next
Chapter. Where the published analysis of post-CICA activity




Data collection efforts drew upon the literature
research but: encompassed original work as well. Collected
data are reported by functional categories: bid protest
process measures; contract stays and terminations; and
agency personnel perceptions. Within each category, data
are subcategorized by data source.
19
It has proven useful to deal with the bid protest
process using an elementary systems engineering framework:
inputs, process (with feedback) , and outputs. Such a
framework provided a reference structure which: 1) helped
organize the numerous measures of bid protest process
functions, and 2) could be superimposed readily on the
functional category/ data source subcategory structure
without disrupting it.
2 . GAP Performance Data
Granted the assumption that bid protests were
resolved in a more or less formal process, then some set of
functional process measures—either formal or informal
—
already existed. It followed logically that the starting
point was the GAO measures of its own activity.
Since at least the late 1960 's, GAO has made
available summary statistics of its bid protest activity
after the close of each fiscal year [7:514:C-1 1 ] . Only
macroscopic measures were released in the early years.
However, by 1974 a resume framework illustrating data for
the five most recent years had been developed [7:455:A-16]
.
It was used consistently until CICA enactment
[7: 734, 7:775, 7:8 18 ,7:864,7:910,7:39,7:41,7:43] . For
illustration purposes, a composite of the resumes which
^Subsequent references to the Federal Contracts Report
cite reference number: volume number: page citation, e.g.,
Reference #7, Volume 514, page C-l.
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appeared during the time period of interest is provided in
Table 1.
Over the period 1974 to 1984, an increasing amount
of supplemental data were also provided with each passing
year. By the time CICA became effective, supplemental data
filled the greater portion of five pages [7:45:339-341].
Prior to CICA, GAO did not formally publish these data as
stand-alone matters of record either in the Federal Register
or as a numbered report to Congress, as were most GAO
reports [8]. But: they were included in the Annual Report of
the Comptroller General of the United States [2:40].
With the enactment of CICA, GAO began to publish the
data as a numbered GAO report [9,10]. CICA required only
that GAO provide Congress:
not later than January 31 of each year ... a report
describing each instance of an agency failure to comply
with the Comptroller General recommendations during the
preceding fiscal year (31 U.S.C. 3554 (e) (2) } [9:1].
In both reports submitted in fulfillment of this
mandate, GAO has appended such summary statistics [9,10].
The FY 85 report rendered a dual accounting of pre-CICA and
post-CICA statistics that was somewhat lengthy and complex,
but the statistics were readily traceable to the format of
the pre-CICA supplemental data [9].
The FY 86 report proved equally lengthy [10]. The
data contained in the post-CICA reports differed somewhat
from each other as well as from the pre-CICA data. A GAO
attorney indicated that the changes reflected an attempt to
21
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develop measures that would be easily understood by the
Congress. Unsatisfactory experiences in Congressional
appearances motivated the effort; similar changes are a good
possibility in the future [11]
.
GAO implied that its chosen statistics had merit in
assessing bid protest process performance. This assertion
was made in GAO ' s fiscal year (FY) 86 report which asserted
the "responsibility" to create "an efficient bid protest
process" as justification for the submission of the annual
summary statistical evidence to Congress [10:4]. It would
make little sense if GAO submitted irrelevant or
inappropriate data to the Congress.
3
.
Secondary Publication of GAO Data
Trade newsletters such as Federal Contracts Report
and Government Contracts Service abstract and publish the
GAO data shortly after release [7,12]. These synopses were
readily available in libraries; consequently this researcher
relied on these secondary sources. Random cross checks
between the newsletters and GAO reports were made to assure
fidelity.
4 Navy Field Activity Data
Additional data was sought from Department of the
Navy contracting activities by informal liaison. These
activities were the primary source of information regarding
unintended consequences and stay or injunction actions.
23
Again , access to key personnel proved to be a valuable
source.
The bid protest statistics were obtained with mixed
results. The staff of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN,S&L) was involved in
receiving limited data from the various Systems Commands as
part of a short term, post-CICA monitoring effort [13]. The
submissions were terse summary documents called "after
action" reports that summarized GAO case dispositions,
including estimated processing cost to the agency. Little,
if any analysis of these data was being performed by either
the submitting activities or ASN,S&L and no management
decisions were based on the data. Neither were the data
consolidated to verify GAO statistics. Similar data did not
exist for activity prior to CICA. ASN,S&L was able to
provide only limited summary data for NAVSUP activity for
one calendar year, 1986. [13]
Two Systems Commands—the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) were
unable to provide better data, and NAVSUP could not
conveniently access the same data it provided to ASN,S&L
[13,14]. Within NAVAIR and NAVSUP the burden of preparing
after action reports fell to the field activity legal staffs
[14,16,17], Contracting staff participation in data
collection, if present, was minimal [16]. The after action
reports were prepared as a closeout task, submitted to
24
ASN,S&L via the Headquarters staff and promptly forgotten.
They apparently remained in the record only by specific case
and were not the basis for management control or
information.
At the ICP and NRCC level, cooperative individuals
were able to resurrect selective aspects of the bid protest
process statistics. Field activities withdrew some data
from the Procurement Management Reporting System (PMRS)
operated by the Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) for
NAVSUP. These data were based on DD Form 3 50 contract data
and had limited usefulness to the study [18]. Protest
information was not included in the Federal Procurement Data
System (FPDS) operated by the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) [19:Encl.l].
Generally there was no formalized data base or
tracking system required and bid protest data apparently
were not used routinely to manage activity contracting
performance. For those few activities that did compile
data, they reviewed it in passing and the organizations were
otherwise not concerned unless specific, alarming material
was noted [18]. Supervisors did not routinely manage to bid
protest process statistics [20].
5 . Alternate Sources
This researcher found no other major data sources
for GAO performance measures. GAO answered only to the
Congress and Congress had imposed no reporting requirements.
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There appeared to be no independent "watchdog" organizations
that monitored GAO performance. Furthermore, the
contracting literature was largely mute regarding award
protest statistics beyond the newsletters mentioned above.
D. CASE DATA
Review and analysis of GAO findings provided a fertile
ground to explore the explicit and implicit rationale and
justifications for decisions. Decisions of the Comptroller
General were reported by Federal Legal Information Through
Electronics (FLITE) , which is "an automated legal research
system established by the Department of Defense and operated
by the U.S. Air Force use by all federal agencies [21]."
GAO customarily titles decisions either published or
unpublished. The technical distinction is a moot point
since both types appeared in the FLITE data.
The FLITE data base provided access to the published and
unpublished decisions of the Comptroller General which were
included up to approximately April 1985, which formed the
bulk of case data used. Via FLITE, access was also gained
to LEXIS*R for more recent decisions of the Comptroller





As noted above in the discussions of bibliographic
research and data collection, telephone interviews were
essential to the research.
A second, distinct use of telephone interviews was
to assess field activity personnel awareness and attitudes
regarding the bid protest process. This section addresses
the methods used to interview these individuals.
The perceptions of Navy field activity personnel
were sought for several purposes. First, contracting
officers in the field operated daily at the point of entry
for bid protests, consequently their attitudes and
perceptions were highly relevant. Second, the contracting
officers were at the end of the chain of events that began
with enactment of legislation. By contrasting the field
activity perceived changes to the Congressionally intended
changes, the dilution occurring in the distribution process
could be assessed. Third and finally, the first-hand users
of the law had the best view of unintended consequences. By
going directly to these people, the communication errors
which could occur when a message is sent back from the field




The purposes of these telephone interviews was to
sample the opinions of field activity personnel and to
27
elicit information regarding the legislative impact of CICA.
The scope of the survey was limited and it was not intended
to be a statistically significant analysis.
Relevant questions were determined based on
bibliographic research and preliminary data collection
efforts. The questions were selected as a range of topics
to be addressed in the course of each ongoing discussion.
Appendix A presents the raw form interview checklist
used by the researcher as a guide during each interview.
The heading information related to organization, position,
and commodity area and the first question were intended to
disclose the experience level of the individual. Special
attention was paid to determining whether the individual was
involved in contracting at the time the law changed.
Question 2 was intended to provide an assessment of the
working knowledge of the individual interviewed regarding
protest procedures. Questions 3 through 11 focus on how
protests were handled and contracting officer attitudes
about protests within each organization. Care was taken
that the interviewer not introduce CICA at this point.
However, if the respondent began to talk about the matter,
it was pursued freely. Questions 12-15 then addressed the
awareness and knowledge of the individual about the CICA
changes and his or her opinions were solicited.
The telephone checklist was tested in three
face-to-face interviews of students at the Naval
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Postgraduate School who had prior experience in field
activity procurement. The test proved that the questions
were not unreasonable and seemed likely to work in a
telephone environment.
The scope of the interviews included five interviews
at each ICP and three interviews at each NRCC, for a total
of 19. The individuals interviewed were chosen with the
assistance of highly-placed military or civilian contacts.
Experienced contracting officers were sought.
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III. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Overview
Disputes can occur in the process leading to award
of a Government contract. Typically disputes arise from
matters such as allegations that a technical evaluation was
improperly conducted, the type solicitation was improper
according to agency rules or regulations, the low bidder was
not qualified, or the bidder awarded the contract was not
responsive to the terms of the solicitation. [2:5]
Certain administrative and judicial actions are
available in the event of such a dispute. The collection of
alternative actions available to a dissatisfied bidder
comprise what can be called, for want of a better term, an
award protest system.
One event seems central in the literature regarding
the award protest system—the work of the Commission on
Government Procurement (COGP) . The Commission was created
in 1969 to conduct a major, comprehensive investigation of
the Government procurement process with a view towards
improving the management of Federal procurement [1:3,100].
The ensuing study spanned more than two years. By virtue of
its timing and comprehensive nature, COGP provided a
convenient and efficient framework from which to discuss the
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award protest system. The achievements of COGP are
sufficiently definitive to establish a good baseline.
In a February 1972 Final Report, COGP Study Group #4
(Remedies) clearly described "the entire federal procurement
picture" relating to contract remedies [4:1]:
From its inception, the law of public contracts has
been cast in the mold of specialty. Under the impact of
the twentieth century with its capacity to exhaust
resources and the surge of modern technology creating new
needs while satisfying old wants, there rapidly developed
mounting controversy surrounding the rights and duties of
individual private contractors and their customer, the
United States.
Remedies had to be designed and implemented which
would permit speedy, expeditious and skilled review and
settlement of claims. The first impulse was for the head
of the department responsible to attempt to settle the
controversies on his own, quickly and finally, so as to
avoid the long course of litigation resulting from formal
suit. This procedure was quickly modified at the
beginning of World War I. The exigencies of massive
wartime procurement in that period with the corresponding
increase in disputes initiated the modern era of public
contract law. The department head could no longer
personally deal with every claim and the War Boards were
created to review contractor claims expertly and
expeditiously. An intricate system of administrative
appeals and judicial review was thus beginning to evolve
gradually. Expediency required one type of remedy one
time and a different type another time, and consequently,
the system has become complex, fragmented and redundant. A
segment of industry believes that the remedial process as
it currently exists is also excessively time-consuming and
very expensive, especially with respect to small dollar
value claims. This is paradoxical in view of the original
intention to provide a system designed for speedy and
inexpensive disposition of claims with a minimum of
formality and judicial intervention. [4:4-5]
Several points in this lengthy quotation deserve to
be emphasized by way of introducing the award protest
system. First, award protests constitute one of two
recognized classes of remedies; specifically, they are pre-
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contract remedies "available to a contractor or prospective
contractor in a protest against award [4:11]." This is in
contrast to contractual remedies, often called disputes,
that apply to disagreements between parties actually bound
by contract. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
differentiate between protests and disputes in this same
manner [6:33-1,3].
Second, the protest system which has evolved
includes three forums: protests to the contracting agency,
protests to the General Accounting Office (GAO) , and
judicial system protests.
Third, the working definition of bid protests
—
"complaints lodged against the operations of the bidding or
contract award process by interested parties in forums
designed to receive those complaints"—indirectly addresses
the question of who may protest [4:148]. The abbreviated
discussion of the right to protest that follows is intended
to identify and survey an issue area rather than to address
the matter definitively. A complete discussion would
require more extensive analysis of Federal court findings.
For the purposes of this research, it is sufficient to
recognize that the matter of entitlement has some measure of
controversy ; that the controversy is, at present, strongest
in the judicial forum; and to know something of the scope of
the issue.
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2 . The Right to Protest
The operant words, interested party, have a meaning
intended to bound the legal entitlement of " . . . those who
desire to enter into a contract with the Government. . . .
[2:147]." As COGP noted:
Unlike disputes occurring under a contract, no clause
in the solicitation gives the offeror a right to protest.
Nor is such found in any statutory language. The basic
executive procurement regulations and procedures
promulgated by the General Accounting Office (GAO) permit
protests against the award of a contract to be logged with
the agency that solicited the award and with the GAO.
Protests may also be filed with the U.S. district courts
or Court of Claims 1 . . . . [2:5]
In selecting the term "interested party," COGP
avoided the fundamental question of who has standing to
protest a contract award. Rather, they assumed the then-
existing award system as a starting point. As COGP saw
matters, the term "interested party" implied: 1) that
protest rights accrue to parties that were not immediately
apparent; and, 2) that such accrued rights differ slightly
among the three forums.
Protests to the contracting agency were permissable
for interested parties, which was defined conservatively to
encompass " . . .an actual or prospective offeror whose
direct economic interest would be affected by the award or
failure to award a particular contract:" [6:32-1].
Presumably, each agency was left to interpret who falls into
the interested party category, yet, undoubtedly, agency
1Former title. Now known as the U.S. Claims Court.
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judgement must be biased by the regulatory dictate that each
".
. . interested party . . . (is) encouraged to seek
resolution within the agency before filing a protest with
the GAO. . . . " [2:37]. Contracting officers can best meet
the spirit of the FAR by liberal interpretation of
interested party status, thus permitting more lower-level
resolutions.
Likewise, protests to GAO are subject to an
interested party rule, but as the term has been interpreted
by decisions of the Comptroller General. GAO has broadly
applied interested party " . . .to include contractors who
have not submitted bids because the specifications are
considered too restrictive, potential subcontractors at any
tier, or even associations and labor unions" [4:157]. These
less obvious outsiders of standing are sometimes called
"third-parties" and their protests are termed "third party
protests" [21]
.
The COGP study did not mention any criticisms
resulting from appeals in which either the contracting
agency or GAO took an excessively restrictive interpretation
of the right to protest that unnecessarily disenfranchised a
protestor. Consequently, it can be assumed that—at least
at the time of COG?
—
protestors, as a group, had no
significant quarrel with the interested party test.
The judicial forum does not rely on the interested
party definition at all. Originally, a 1940 Supreme Court
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ruling found that "... protestors have no right (standing)
to have their protests heard in a court of law, because the
Federal procurement statutes confer no judicially
enforceable rights on offerors for Government contracts"
[2:7]. Only in 1970 did Federal courts reverse the prior
decision, thereby interpreting legal standing more broadly
to permit protestors this opportunity. "In 1970 two
decisions . . . squarely held that offerors have standing to
challenge administrative action taken in the contract award
process" [4 : 163]
.
At first reading, judicial interpretation of the
protestor's rights seems narrower than the interested party
test in that the courts refer to "disappointed bidders" and
use as authority the Administrative Procedures Act (5
U.S.C.701 et seq} 2 . This legal basis implies the bidder
must have actually submitted a bid for which an "...
administrative decision ..." was "... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" [23:10]. Thus, third parties and
similarly distant interested parties who might achieve a
hearing before the contracting officer or the GAO could be
refused. However, COGP reported:
. . . certain United States Supreme Court decisions issued
shortly after . . . have enabled the federal courts to
find standing not only for offerors on Government
contracts but also for others, such as labor unions and
References to the statutes of the United States Code
are cited as volume/U.S.C./part.
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contractor associations, whose interests in Government
contracts are "arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected or regulated by the statute of constitutional
guarantee in question." [4:162-164]
In its final Report, one COGP conclusion addresses
the "... need to clarify authority for judicial review of
contract award decisions," however, no corresponding
recommendation was incorporated. (Although, COGP did
emphasize that "the judicial review of award protests has
value.") [3:99]
In sum, a dissatisfied protestor has limited rights
to submit his case to any or all of the three forums. While
a hierarchy is suggested to the protestor, it has not been
established in an integrated and coherent fashion since
concurrent efforts are possible and levels can be bypassed.
Adherence to the hierarchy is favorable to the protestor in
that each higher level requires a more cumbersome and
presumably more costly submission. Slight variations in the
definitions of rights might permit some protests in a given
forum that might be disallowed in another, but, in general,
the right to protest is limited to those with a demonstrable
interest in the award.
In the balance of this chapter, we will identify and
trace nhe evolution of the award protest system; review the
alternatives available for protest; examine in detail the
administrative process of protest to the GAO; and look at
how the CICA altered the GAO process.
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B. THE AWARD PROTEST SYSTEM
1. Overview
COGP identified and described an award protest
system consisting of " . . . three principal forums where
bid protests may be adjudicated: the contracting agency,
the GAO, and the courts" [2:4-35,4:148]. Figure 1 depicts
that process. The contracting agency and GAO alternatives
are administrative, while the Federal courts option is
judicial in nature.
COGP also provided a concise synopsis of the
hierarchical workings of the three forums:
If a protestor initially lodges his protest with the
procuring agency, and does not prevail, he may lodge the
same protest with GAO. ... If the protestor is
dissatisfied with the GAO opinion, he may, in turn, lodge
the identical protest with the federal courts.
If the protestor lodges his initial protest with GAO,
then he may, if dissatisfied with the GAO decision, file
the protest with a federal court.
If the protestor protests first to a federal court,
then he may not lodge that protest in another forum. The
contracting agencies and GAO are bound by the court's
decision. The protestor's only recourse is to appeal an
adverse decision through that court's particular appellate
structure. [4:166-167]
We will examine each of the three forums in
hierarchical, sequential order in the sections that follow,
while adding special emphasis to the GAO forum because it is
the focus of the research. The necessary framework includes
a working knowledge of the total award protest system.
Relevant portions of the history of bid protests pertain to
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DISPUTES RELATED TO AWARD OF CONTRACTS















FWST PROTEST TO AGENCY
Source: [3:6]
Figure 1. Disputes Related to Award of Contracts
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understanding the underlying legislative intent of CICA;
consequently, they are also included in the narrative.
2. Protest to the Contracting Agency
The primary alternative available to an interested
party (as defined and discussed supra) is direct protest to
the contracting agency. Such protests seek administrative
resolution of an executive branch action. While Federal
procurement regulations stipulate a right to protest to the
contracting officer directly, they are silent regarding
higher level appeals. The detailed working data compiled
and published by COGP showed a wide range of practices and
procedures among the various Federal agencies concerning how
and by whom protests were resolved [24:A33-40]. COGP
inferred from the data that the regulations allowed protests
to higher authority within the contracting agency. COGP
noted that resolution at the contracting officer level was,
in fact, exceptional and higher level decision occurred more
frequently [24:33].
Protest to the contracting agency is the preferred
course of action. "GAO regulations, in fact, now urge the
protestor first to seek resolution of its complaint with the
procuring agency before it proceeds to GAO [2:37]." The
reason for rhe preference is the simplicity and expediency
offered at this level.
The FAR is conspicuously silent regarding grounds
for protest as well as what constitutes a valid protest
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submission. Procedures for protest to the agency are
equally elusive. The FAR procedures as written concern
guidance to Government contracting officers regarding what
to do, but are conspicuously silent to would-be protestors
on procedures about how to make a complaint. This bias
existed at the time of COGP [4:155]. It remains unrectified
at the present.
Regulations for both defense and civilian agencies
require that contracting officers not only consider all
protests, but also delay award until any protest is
resolved, unless the contracting officer can determine that:
1) the supplies and services to be contracted for are
urgently required; or
2) delivery or performance will be unduly delayed by
failure to make award promptly; or
3) a prompt award will otherwise be advantageous to the
Government. [2:5,4:156,6:33-1]
These same provisions exist in the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and the Federal Procurement
Regulations (FPR) that were superceded by the FAR in April
1984 [4:154], Furthermore, agency regulations required
approval by an official above the contracting officer level
for award in the face of a protest [4:166].
Resolution of protests by the procuring agency
occurs administratively without formal hearings or
procedures and is usually based on the written record
[2 : 6, 36; 4 : 156] . These protests continue to be processed
even when concurrent with a GAO protest. However, agency
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action does stop when a judicial protest is filed. Final
decisions must be issued to the protestor in writing [6:37-
!]•
If a protestor does not prevail in a protest to the
procuring agency, he may lodge the same protest to the GAO
[4:166]. Notably, there is no provision in procurement
regulations for higher appeal of an unsuccessful protest to
a " judicialized forum such as a board of contract appeals"
[2:6]. However, it is interesting to note that ASPR and FPR
suggested that the procuring agencies solicit the views of
GAO "regarding the protest wherever such action is
considered desirable" [4:157].
3 . Protest to the GAO
a. Overview
The second forum in the award protest hierarchy
is protest to the GAO. A dissatisfied bidder or offeror who
has an interest (as discussed previously) in a Government
contract may file a protest to the GAO "... provided the
accounts of the agency . . . are subject to settlement by
GAO. . . . " [2:6]. This limitation rarely applies. To
reiterate a point made earlier, the protest can be filed
subsequent to protest to the contracting officer or directly
to the GAO without seeking a contracting officer
determination, but protestors are urged to attempt
resolution first with the contracting agency. Like
contracting officer protests, GAO protests are
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administrative matters. They differ in that they are
legislative rather than executive branch actions.
Additional unique features of this forum are discussed
in more detail in the following sections because of the
importance of the GAO forum to the research topic.
b. Legal Basis of the GAO Bid Protest Process
GAO, itself, was established by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 [1:134]. The Comptroller General
rendered the first GAO bid protest decision in 1925 [4:225].
At that time, GAO questioned its own jurisdiction but
resolved the matter internally and the jurisdiction issue
was not mentioned in the written decision [4:225]. As COGP
noted:
GAO has construed its "settlement powers" as including
the implied authority to decide bid protests. This theory
rests upon an obligation, as part of its duty to audit and
settle public accounts, to determine the legality of
contract expenditures and assure compliance with the laws
and regulations relating to expenditure of public funds.
By deciding bid protests, therefore, GAO concludes that it
is, in fact, preventing unauthorized payments by
determining in advance the validity of a contract which
obligates public funds. GAO acknowledges there is no
specific provision of law which authorizes the Comptroller
General to consider bid protests and that it became an
adjudicatory forum "because a need for their type of
review was recognized and there was no other agency to
undertake jurisdiction in the area. [4:159-160]
Prior to CICA, no statute expressly authorized
GAO to decide bid protests. Thus, the role of GAO as a bid
protest adjudicator began and continues under a cloud of low
level, yet persistent controversy. The matter of GAO legal
authority to hear bid protests is a constitutional issue
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concerning the separation of powers doctrine that has been
argued continuously in legal forums since the earliest times
of the United States. As will be discussed later, this
specific argument caused delays in implementing CICA in
1985, but it is not presently a factor that materially
affects how the GAO protest process functions. What is
significant is the fact that GAO manifestly exercised this
authority from 1925 through 1984 in the absence of specific
statute, but with tacit and oft-repeated Congressional
forbearance [25:10]. The volume of protests alone indicated
that a need existed. No alternative organization met the
need nor did any agency try to oppose the GAO initiative.
c. GAO Bid Protest Procedures
GAO bid protest procedures are published in the
Code of Federal Regulations at 4 CFR Part 20, thus providing
both actual and constructive notice to all would-be
contractors and protestors. Agency regulations reference
the GAO procedures. GAO procedures do not limit explicitly
what may be protested. But, GAO restricts its own
jurisdiction in several ways:
1) GAO will not consider protest matters that involve
Small Business Administration (SBA) determinations of
"size or status" or "eligibility for Federal
procurements" '26,27,28]. Such matters are referred to
S3A for resolution.
2) GAO defers challenges of eligibility under the Walsh-
Healy Act to the Department of Labor, and,
3) GAO will not entertain ". . .a protest against an
affirmative determination of responsibility ... in
the absence of a showing of possible fraud or bad
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faith on the part of a contracting officer or a
failure to apply definitive responsibility criteria"
[26,29]
.
By the nature of its decisions, the GAO bid
protest process has some characteristic features. First,
GAO places an unstated emphasis on the timing of the
protest.
. . . GAO considers the timing of the protest to be
important. Where the protest is made after award . . .
(GAO) may decide that, although the award was contrary to
the rules, full performance ... is nevertheless in the
best interest of the Government. . . . [10]
Thus, protests subsequent to award are considered at the
discretion of GAO and the best interest of the Government is
factored into the final decision. Such late protests can
gain the protestor "a moral victory, but a practical
defeat—he gets no cigar" [30] . Second, even when the
protest is valid and timely, GAO will not require award to
the protestor, but grants the agency the right to resolicit
or cancel. COGP reported :
If a protest is successfully made before award (and)
the solicitation is somehow defective ... no valid award




If the protest before award alleges the proposed
recipient ... is ineligible, GAO will state that the
award may or cannot be made. The agency retains the
right., to resolicit or cancel. . . . [4:157-158]
Taken together, these characteristics and other unstated
decision criteria that can be found in the decisions create
a bias that generally favors the Government contracting
agency absent a showing of significant deviation.
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GAO protests are considered informally by an
assigned attorney based on the written record [2:6].
Proceedings are "ex parte" 3 reviews based on the written
record. Unless, or until, a protest is filed with the
courts, GAO will process the matter. At the time of legal
filing, GAO will dismiss any protest unless the court
requests a GAO decision (4 CFR 21}. Decisions are rendered
by the assigned attorney and, after high-level internal
review, are issued by the Comptroller General,
d. Effect of GAO Recommendations
Yet another aspect of the constitutionality
argument over GAO authority concerns the effective power of
GAO decisions. The COGP report noted:
GAO has no power when adjudicating a protest to
prevent the award of a contract or to have the contracting
agency comply with the time requirements it has
established for the processing of protests. GAO has never
recommended money damages for a successful protestor, but
it has recommended that the agency resolicit the
procurement or terminate a previously awarded contract for
the convenience of the Government [2:6].
COGP clarified the point further:
. . . GAO considers its bid protest decisions to be
binding on the procuring agencies and that they "have no
appeal from a GAO decision other than to request GAO
reconsideration. [4:162]
The other side of the argument is the Justice
Department position:
3Ex parte: Black's Law Dictionary defines this term as
"on one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf
of, of in the application of one party only. Ex parte
hearings consider "only one side of the controversy."
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. . . that GAO decisions in bid protest matters are not
binding on the Executive Branch of Government because the
Comptroller General has no statutory authority to perform
this- function. [4:229]
The continued presence of the argument can be
found in the fact that, although the final reports are
termed decisions, GAO still issues recommendations.
e. Right to Appeal
Another feature of the GAO forum is that "...
a protestor . . . has the right to seek judicial review of
his protest even after it has been considered by GAO"
[4:1621 .
f. Issues, Criticisms, and Recommendations in the
Literature
At the time of its 1972 "... study of the
currently existing methods of recourse available to a
contractor or prospective contractor in a protest against
award . . .
.
, COGP found major problems confronting the
award protest system [2:59,4:11]. CICA was partially aimed
at solving some of the problems that COGP highlighted
[1:3,100]. Other authors cite a general recognition that
the GAO procedures were "unfair and ineffective" [24:11].
To emphasize what has been previously stated
supra, COGP concluded "that the award protest system needs
improvement. in the interest of greater fairness and
effectiveness" [3:95]. Three major problems were cited:
1) an absence of procedures and remedies that will assure
fairness in the treatment of protestors,
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2) delay in processing protests through the
administrative forums . .
.
, and
3) the lack of an effective plan for reducing the number
of protests. [2:7,3:95]
One symptom of the first two problems was GAO
inability to "enjoin or stop performance by the successful
contractor while the underlying protest issues were being
decided" [25:10] . When coupled with procedural delay, a
winning contractor could spend money and speed performance
in the interim. A successful protestor could thus win only
a GAO admonition to the agency not to repeat its mistake.
The COGP determined that the root cause was "the
absence of a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated
regulatory scheme for administrative resolution and
avoidance of protests" [3:95].
The following actions were recommendations
contained in the final COGP report [3:96-100]:
1) Promulgate award protest procedures that adequately
inform protestors of the steps that can be taken to
seek review of administrative decisions in the
contract award process.
2) Continue the General Accounting Office as an award
protest resolving forum.
3) Establish, through executive branch and GAO
cooperation, more expeditious and mandatory time
requirements for processing protest through the GAO.
4) Establish in the executive procurement regulations, in
cooperation with the General Accounting Office, a
coordinated requirement for high-level management
review of any decision to award a contract while a
protest is pending with GAO.
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5) GAO should continue to recommend termination for
convenience of the Government of improperly awarded
contracts in appropriate instances.
6) Improve contracting agency debriefing procedures.
7) Establish a pre-award protest procedure in all
contracting agencies.
8) Conduct periodic reviews by GAO of agency award
protest procedures and practices.
Only the second recommendation—to continue the GAO forum
—
drew a dissenting opinion. And then, the dissenter sought
to redress the long-standing constitutional issue by
shifting the function to the Department of Justice [3:96].
Two other conclusions were reported without a
corresponding recommendation. First, the Commission "did
not recommend" the "full battery of due process procedures
used in court," rather, it endorsed simple procedures that
"insure 'basic fairness 1 or objective consideration of award
protest" [3:98]. Second, the report concluded that
"consideration should be given to clarifying the statutory
basis for court jurisdiction" and endorsed the use of
injunctive relief and award of proposal preparation costs as
damages" [3:99]
.
COGP summarized its recommendations as follows:
The award protest system, a necessary and beneficial
aspect of the procurement process, needs improvement in
the interest of greater fairness and effectiveness. The
major problems confronting the system are (1) an absence
of procedures and remedies that will assure fairness in
the treatment of protestors; (2) delay in processing
protests through the administrative forums; and (3) the
lack of an effective plan for reducing the number of
protests. At the heart of these problems lies the absence
of a comprehensive, coordinate, and integrated regulatory
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scheme for administrative resolution and avoidance of
protests. [2:7]
The Study Group proposed two alternative award
protest systems as replacements for the current system in
their summary report. The alternatives differ in the number
of forums and in the functions to be exercised by GAO
[4:149].
(1) Alternative System I . This alternative
maintains the framework of the existing system. As before,
a protestor would have three options for protest: procuring
agency, GAO, or the Federal courts. But the alternative
differs by "addition of a rule making function for GAO and
certain improvements in GAO procedures" [4:1491.
The modified system would invoke time
limits on the decision making process, eliminate the
presumption of agency propriety, and require publication of
GAO decisions. Additional changes to GAO procedures would
permit an option for de novo4 hearings, if the GAO protest
followed an initial decision at the agency level. A novel
approach would grant GAO a rule making function "for the
purposes of promulgating uniform bid protest procedures"
that would be binding on the agencies [4:151].
4de novo: Black's Law Dictionary defines this term as
"anew, afresh, a second time;" "as if no decision had
previously been rendered."
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The judicial forum would be retained and
judicial remedies would include award of damages as well as
full injunctive relief.
(Nine of 14 members favored this
alternative.
)
(2) Alternative System II . The second
alternative award protest system proffered by the Study
Group eliminated GAO as a protest forum. Protest to the
contracting agency would be a required first step, but
individual procuring agencies would decide such protests at
a centralized level above, and independent from, the
contracting officer.
During a fixed time established for
receiving protests, awards would be withheld or work
suspended. Later protests would be considered only if
alleging fraud.
Upon an unsatisfactory decision by the
agency, a protestor could seek de novo review in a "federal
court empowered to enforce agency requirements, award
damages, and grant injunctions."
The GAO role would be reduced to annual
review of protest decisions and recommendations of
procedural changes co the agencies, who would be free to
accept or reject the proposed rules. [4:151-153]




4 . Protest to the Courts
This third forum in the award protest system was
described by COGP in a clear manner that merits quoting:
Until 1970, there were virtually no other forums
available in this century for the adjudication of bid
protests. The courts had consistently held that bidders
had no standing to obtain judicial review of
administrative actions taken in the contract award process
because federal procurement statutes conferred no
judicially enforceable rights upon offerors for Government
contracts. Intertwined with this proposition was the
concern expressed in some decisions that the court would
be substituting its judgement for what were essentially
discretionary acts of procurement officials, and,
therefore, judicial bid protests were also dismissed on
the ground that administrative procurement decisions were
not reviewable by a court of law.
. . . . Not only was the offerer precluded from going
directly to court to challenge administrative action, he
was also precluded from seeking review of an agency or GAO
decision on his protest. [4:162-164]
After opening the judicial process, the courts
turned to the task of defining what relief which should be
offered. Initial cases indicated broad remedies, but the
trend circa COGP was to restricted use of injunctive relief
and awards were limited to damages. [4:165] "The federal
district courts have both injunctive powers and the power to
award damages, however, the Court of Claims may only award
damages" [4:166].
For cases appealed subsequent to GAO review, ". . .
the court is not bound by statement of facts or law in the
GAO decision and may examine the merits of the protest on a
de novo basis" yet "... the court may properly take into
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account the concurrence of the General Accounting Office"
with the contracting agency's position" [4:166-167].
In Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer (1970)
,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit opened the
judicial forum. While Scanwell is most recognized as the
decision affecting the right to protest, its greater value
was the new potential for injunctive relief. The drawback
to protestors in using this forum is that injunctions are
extraordinary and are rarely granted. "To receive a
restraining order before a court, one must demonstrate
probability of success on the merits, irreparable injury,
absence of substantial harm to other interested parties and
absence of harm to the public interest" [5:6]. The
difficulty in demonstrating a "substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits" poses a sizable hurdle for many
protestors [25:11], In consequence, Scanwell never lived up
to its "initial promise" [25:11].
A second case, M. Steinthal & Co. v. Semms, further
confused use of the judicial forum. In Steinthal the Court
indicated that it would sustain the agency award "if there
was any rational basis" for the agency decision and also
stated that "judges could exercise their discretion and
grant no relief to protestors in cases where nhe challenged
agency had no rational basis."
Thus Steinthal and other post-Scanwell decisions of
the courts communicated "a strong disinclination toward
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complex procurement litigation." These barriers in the
judicial process left most protestors "mired in the GAO
procedure." [25:11]
C. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT OF 1984
1. Introduction
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984,
which is formally named "Title VII of the Spending Reduction
Act and Deficit Reduction Act of 1984" and is also known as
P.L. 98-369 modifies existing Federal procurement statutes
and the GAO bid protest process. It "may stand out as being
the keynote for government procurement processes during the
next decade and perhaps much longer" [1:118,31:4].
Although passed only a few short months after the
long awaited and much touted FAR became effective April 1,
1984, CICA forced major FAR revisions. (The FAR completely
replaced prior procurement regulations for civilian and
defense agencies with what was intended to be one concise,
unified set of acquisition regulations applicable to all
Federal agencies.) That CICA overpowered the release of FAR
is one clear indication of its importance.
"CICA's main purpose was to increase competition in
the award of government contracts", but " . . . in passing
CICA, Congress sought to eliminate the imbalances in the
protest system" as well [5:3,25:11]. The legislation was
signed into law July 18, 1984. Bid protest provisions
53
became active January 1 while the remainder of the
provisions became effective April 1, 1985.
2. The Language of the Act
A proper understanding of CICA begins with the
literal and contextual meaning of the statute and progresses
to the legislative intent and any subsequent judicial
interpretation of the actual law. Since CICA is relatively
new, judicial interpretations are very limited and the task
is somewhat simplified. It is essential to grasp fully the
intended consequences as well as the literal changes.
a. CICA Provisions
The major changes resulting from CICA can be
summarized as follows [32:45]:
- eliminates preference for formal advertising and puts
competitive negotiation on the same level as sealed bid
procedures.
- eliminates the seventeen exceptions to formal advertis-
ing and establishes seven exceptions under which "other
than competitive procedures" may be used.
- requires sealed bid procedures when four specific
conditions are met, otherwise competitive proposals
shall be requested.
- allows agency heads to exclude a particular source of
supply in competitive procedures in order to establish
or maintain an alternative source or sources of supply
under certain conditions.
- allows the head of an agency to limit competition to
small business concerns only, so long as all firms
within the category are allowed to compete. (However,
the exemption of the Section 8(a) program remains.)
- exempts small purchases (i.e., under $25,000) but states
competition must be promoted to the maximum extent
practicable.
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- lowers the threshold for the Truth in Negotiations Act
from $500,000 to $100,000.
- lowers the threshold for Commerce Business Daily
notices for solicitation and awards.
- requires an "advocate for competition" in each executive
agency.
- requires an annual report to Congress from each agency.
- incorporates innovative protest and dispute procedures.
Other provisions of CICA established automatic
data processing procurement protests as a separate category
and directed them to the General Services Administration
Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) as review authority.
Within the context of CICA, the bid protest
features encompassed only a relatively small portion of the
new law, not only in paper volume but in intent as well.
However, the modifications are significant because they
formally empower the Comptroller General (i.e., the GAO) to
hear protests and to reformat the award protest system:
- by directing GAO to issue and publicize bid protest
procedures
;
- by setting mandatory time limits for decisions on the
merits of the protests;
- by making protest injunctions virtually automatic;
- by directing GAO to disregard intervening cost and
performance factors in cases where the agency head
overrides the suspension and allows contract: performance
to continue while the protest is pending; and,
- by granting GAO the power to recommend any of several
actions, including monetary award to protestants to
cover bid protest and bid and proposal (B&P) costs.
[25:11]
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The most significant of these provisions is the
suspension feature. Suspensions are automatic unless the
Government "establishes that urgent and compelling
circumstances which significantly affect the interest of the
United States will not permit waiting for the decision of
the Comptroller General" {31 U.S.C. 3553 (e) } [25:11]. The
burden regarding suspensions is therefore, on the agency.
Butterfield notes that "... this might represent the only
circumstance in our jurisprudence where a party seeking
. . . extraordinary relief does not have to prove anything
to get that relief" [25:11]. "By the single expedient of
merely filing a protest letter, the protestor achieves what
traditionally has required a very substantial evidentiary
showing" [25:11]. Thus, what has become widely known as the
22 cent protest—a passing reference to the postage needed
to file such a protest.
b. Statutes Affected
Officially, CICA amends: the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) {Subtitle A}; the
Armed Services Procurement Act {Subtitle B} ; The Office of
Federal Procurement Policy Act {Subtitle C} ; and Chapter 35
of Title 31 of the U.S.C. {Subtitle D>. CICA also directs
changes to the FAR (Subtitle E}. The text of the act
readily correlates which sections of the above statutes are
modified.
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c. Correlation of Laws and Provisions
Generally, the CICA provisions modify the
statutes cited above in a straightforward manner. Those
provisions of CICA changing competitive procedures, sole
source procurement, planning and solicitation requirements,
cost and pricing data, and small business set asides affect
both the FPASA and ASPA. Provisions relating to
establishment of agency competition advocate affect the OFPP
Act. Bid protest and dispute procedures affect Title 31,
U.S.C. Finally, the Act directs that the FAR be revised to
incorporate all these new policies.
d. Subtitle D: Procurement Protest System
Subtitle D of CICA contains the specific changes
relevant to the bid protest system. It provides new wording
for Section 3551, Chapter 35 of Title 31, U.S.C. Subtitle D
basically addresses three categories of changes: provisions
empowering the GAO; a set of changes requiring prompt
resolution of protests; and, rules that automatically
suspend contract award or require termination of execution
while a protest is pending.
(1) Provisions Empowering the GAO . The first
category of changes grants the Comptroller General the power
to decide protests by interested parties concerning alleged
violations of procurement statute and regulations
[33:2741(a) ] . Some aspects of the new GAO powers are often
overlooked or played down in the literature. One is that
57
the Act establishes a "statutory right to limited sorts of
discovery" in that "any interested party may request from
the federal agencies involved any document relevant to the
protest" although some competitive advantage exclusions
remain [31:7]. A second power is the express authority to
GAO to "verify assertions made by the parties," which
implies giving GAO power to take sworn testimony and to
issue subpoenas.
Additionally, GAO is given authority to
receive protests referred by an executive agency or a court
of the United States. Some authors believe the Act gives
GAO entree to take a more active role in controlling the
overall award protest system [31:7]. The Act explicitly
states that "nothing in this section shall be construed to
give the Comptroller General exclusive jurisdiction over bid
protests" [32:2471(a) ] . The judicial avenue remains
available: the fragmentation of remedies problems remains
unsolved.
The term "interested party," which is used
throughout CICA, is defined in the Act: "an actual or
prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest
would be affected by the award of a contract of by the
failure to award the contract" (4 CFR 21.0(a)}. The term
was used (without definition) in the bid protest procedures
issued by the GAO on April 24, 1975 which became effective
on or of after June 2, 1975 {Sect 20.1(a)}. Since the use
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of the term predates the Act, it is apparent that CICA did
not open new territory in this case, but rather gave the
wording a clear statutory position. Some authors believe
the new definition "much more limited" than prior GAO
interpretation [31:7]
.
The Act does; however, limit protests to
either the judicial or administrative process: "an
interested party who has filed a protest action under
Section 111(h) of the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949" {41 U.S.C. 759(h)} . . . may not file
a protest action . . . under this section. This language
is more restrictive than prior GAO procedures which
provided: "The Comptroller General may refuse to decide
any protest where the matter involved is the subject of
litigation before a court of competent jurisdiction" (4 CFR
20.10}.
The Act also empowers the Comptroller
General to determine whether protests comply with
"procurement statutes and regulations." The scope includes
solicitations, proposed awards, and awards.
GAO is allowed to "dismiss a protest that
the Comptroller General determines is frivolous or which, on
its face, does nor stare a valid basis for protest." While
seemingly innocuous, this feature allows GAO to eliminate
significant delay and administrative overhead by summary
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dismissals. GAO attorneys credit this clause as the basis
for making the protest caseload tractable [8,11].
Where GAO finds noncompliance, they can
"recommend" that the agency:
(A) refrain from exercising any of its options under the
contract:
(B) recompute the contract immediately:
(C) issue a new solicitation:
(D) terminate the contract:
(E) award a contract consistent with the requirements of
such statutes and regulations:







(D) , and (E) , or
(G) comply with such other recommendations as the
Comptroller General determines to be necessary in order to
promote compliance with statutes and regulations.
Note that GAO is only empowered to recommend to the agencies
and not to force compliance. Furthermore, GAO may declare
an "appropriate party to be entitled to the costs of: 1)
filing and pursuing the protest including reasonable
attorneys fees, and 2) bid and proposal preparation. Such
monetary awards "shall be paid promptly by the executive
agency . . . out of funds available for the . . .procurement
of property and services. ..."
This category also includes a requirement
that GAO provide a copy of each decision; signed by the
Comptroller General, or his designated representative, to
protesters and agencies.
The Comptroller General is required by CICA
to report to each House of the Congress by January 31 each
year describing "each instance of an agency failure to
comply with the Comptroller General recommendations during
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the preceding fiscal year." As part of this clause, "...
the head of the procurement activity responsible for award
of contract shall report to the Comptroller General, within
60 days of receipt of the Comptroller General's
recommendations, if the agency has not fully complied with
such recommendations."
(2) Provisions Requiring Prompt Resolution of
Protests . A second category of the subtitle of the CICA
dictates that the final protest decision be issued within 90
working days, absent a written decision based on exceptional
circumstance. In order to achieve the 90 day constraint,
the Act stipulates executive agencies be notified within one
working day and a 2 5 day limit for executive agency
submission of a complete report which includes copies of all
relevant documents. (The time constraints can also be
relaxed by the Comptroller General for exceptional reasons.)
This concern for "inexpensive and expeditious resolution of
protest" also appears in language that requires an "express
option" that limits final decisions to 45 days and executive
agency report submission within 10 days. GAO is granted the
latitude to determine which protests are "suitable for
resolution" under the express option.
(3) Provisions Requiring Stay or Award or
Contract Termination . The third distinct category of
clauses affects contract execution: "A contract may not be
awarded . . . after the contracting officer has received
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notice of a protest to the Comptroller General and while the
protest is pending." This provision adds the exception that
. . . the head of the procurement activity responsible may
authorize the award of contract . . . upon a written
finding that urgent and compelling circumstances which
significantly affect the interests of the United States
will not permit awaiting the decision of the Comptroller
General . . . after the Comptroller General is advised of
such finding.
Such a finding may not be made unless the "award of the
contract is otherwise likely to occur within 30 days."
A second clause mandates that contract
performance be ceased or the contract suspended for post-
award protests filed within 10 days of contract award.
Again, the head of the procurement activity can notify the
Comptroller General and authorize performance based on a
written finding that "contract performance will be in the
Government's best interest" and that the "urgent and
compelling interests of the United States will not permit
awaiting the decision of the Comptroller General."
CICA limited such findings to the head of
the procuring activity alone: the authority cannot be
delegated.
In the case of continued contract
performance, CICA directs the Comptroller General to:
make his determination of riie appropriate recommended
relief (if the protest is sustained) without regard to any
of the costs of disruption from terminating, recompeting,
or awarding the contract. . . . [33:2741]
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3 . Legislative History of the CICA
Since the finite wording of the Act is neither
exhaustive nor definitive in terms of specifying exactly
what the Congress intended, it is important to view the
entire record to gain a valid perspective. Such a global
view is the same as that sought by the courts when they
retroactively interpret laws. Selected pertinent history of
che Act can provide a shortcut in gaining that perspective.
CICA was "the culmination of an effort begun by the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to establish a uniform
government wide procurement statute to replace the ASPA (of
1947) and the FPASA (of 1949) , and to implement other
recommendations of the 1972 Commission on Government
Procurement" [5:2]. The initial, yet unsuccessful
legislative effort was S. 1264, the Federal Acquisition Act
of 1977, sponsored by Senators Chiles (D-Florida) and Roth
(D-Delaware) [32:29]. The intent of S.1264 was ". . .
reform (of) old basic laws and (replacement with) ... a
modern statute aimed at far more intensive and innovative
competition," including reduced numbers of sole source
awards and cutback in the use of detailed specifications
[32:29]
.
A second legislative foray, the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1982, S.2127, was also unsuccessful,
however, it was later reintroduced as the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1983, S.338 by Senators Cohen (R-Maine)
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and Levin (D-Mich.) [32:29; 34]. S.338 included much of the
final version language, but did not address any bid protest
process changes [34,35].
Between the deliberations over S.1264 in 1977 and
S.338 in 1982, several events occurred that influenced the
final outcome. First, in November 1979 the GAO released a
report titled POD Loses Many Competitive Procurement
Opportunities whicn accused DOD for myriad abuses in
awarding noncompetitive contracts [32:29]. Second, much of
the testimony in hearings before the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs focused on increasing trends to more
noncompetitive procurement. Third, a second GAO report Less
Sole Source, More Competition Needed in Federal Civil
Agencies Contracting issued in April 1982 also criticized
the nondefense agencies [32:32]. Fourth, the Congress found
"what they felt was a relationship between negotiating in
the last minute of the fiscal year and unnecessary
noncompetitive contracting" [3:32]. Fifth, in what can only
be considered a major blunder, the highly-touted Carlucci
Initiatives which related to defense acquisition reform
omitted any reference to increasing competition. Sixth, in
the latter part of this period, President Reagan engineered
a major reverse in defense spending -co rhe detriment of
other budget programs near and dear to the constituents of
Congress. In the face of defense budget growth, the
continued apparent bad DOD management (as evidenced in the
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events above) , and other highly visible problems such as
exorbitant spares prices (that received extensive national
publicity) the Congress was motivated to act.
The final form of CICA resulted from a compromise
merger of S.338 and a House Resolution (H.R.5184) sponsored
by Rep. Jack Brooks (D-Texas) . A third resolution submitted
by Rep. Price (D-Ill.) entitled Defense Procurement Reform
Act of 1983, H.R.2545, became part of the final version of
CICA as well [31:4]
.
S.338, the outgrowth of the aforementioned S.2127,
embodied the following changes [32:37]:
- equal statutory preference for sealed bid and competi-
tive negotiation;
- reduced circumstances for noncompetitive procurement
(6 exceptions)
;
- greater public notice, (i.e., CBD publication);
- dual source procurement allowed for certain reasons;
- required use of advanced procurement planning and market
research;
- required designated competition advocates;
- lowered the Truth in Negotiations Act threshold to
$100,000; and,
- required annual report to Congress.
The intent of S.338 remained the same as S.2127 before: to
stimulate competition, to drastically restrict sole source
usage, and to decrease the use of excessive specification.
The general intent of the House resolutions was also
to reaffirm competition, but the House favored use of GAO as
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an enforcement provision. H.R. 2545 was more narrowly
focused on DOD procurement and did not include any bid
protest process reform language [AA] . In contrast, H.R. 5184
authorized GAO authority to hear bid protests and to make a
broad range of determinations. It contained extensive bid
protest procedures language that was merged into the final
form of the CICA during joint conference by deft political
maneuvering.
The entire legislative package gained approval as an
amendment to the House version of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 , which was sent to joint conference committee. The
final product generally reflects the Senate form for
competition matters and the House versions for bid protest
elements.
4 . Summary of Congressional Intent
"CICA's main purpose was to increase competition in
the award of government contracts" [5:3]. By establishing
the legislative requirement to compete regardless of the
method of procurement used—sealed bid or competitive
negotiation—CICA clearly states this Congressional purpose.
The method obvious to a naive reader—to incorporate
competition as a legal requirement into the U.S. statutes
—
would have been largely redundant:, since the legal basis for
competitive contracting dates to 1792 and has been
reaffirmed many times prior to CICA [36:23-38].
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The record of Congressional intent yields a slightly
differing understanding. Several conceptual approaches
underlie the final compromise legislation. At least five
Congressional policies are embodied to a greater or lesser
extent in the final Act:
1) greater use of advance planning associated with
contracting;
2) greater use of market research to buttress the advance
planning;
3) desires to simplify and expedite the acquisition
process;
4) greater use of commercial products to meet government
needs ; and
,
5) improved use of functional and performance
specifications in lieu of detail specifications.
[1:122-126]
In the final analysis, CICA is an amalgamation of
these legislative initiatives directed at a variety of
Federal procurement abuses and shortcomings that continued
to rankle Congress over a period of years. The final
product reflects CICA's multiple origins: multiple changes
to four major laws (FPASA, ASPA, Title 31 U.S.C., and the
OFPP Act) that were enacted in a complex and not fully
integrated fashion. "Although the CICA started on the right
track, it ended up with a curious array of remedies that not
only did not resolve all problems, but created a whole new
series of problems for procuring agencies" [25:12].
Analysis of Congressional desires provides some
insight to its plan for the bid protest process
modifications as well. One clear intent of Congress was to
establish a "series of checks and balances provided by
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increasing levels of review" in order to frustrate any
effort to continue directing awards to a specific contractor
and to better limit unnecessary sole source contracting
[1:2]. Several provisions of the Act provide the desired
checks and balances. The provisions for a Competition
Advocate require an organizational restructure to enforce
the dictate to compete. New publication requirements
provide better public awareness and a built-in alarm system
against abuses. Specific reports are required to provide
continued Congressional oversight. The final element of the
checks and balances was the establishment of new bid protest
procedures at the GAO. These procedures
. . . insure that the mandate for competition would be
followed by providing offerors a meaningful opportunity to
protest an inappropriate government action, and if
appropriate, the chance to secure a meaningful remedy.
Thus, potential contractors would have the means to police
the system. [5:3]
5. Implementation Issue: Constitutionality
Normally implementing new legislation is
straightforward. This was not the case for CICA. The bid
protest provisions of CICA give broad powers relating to
judicial review and executive action to the Comptroller
General, a member of the legislative branch. Judicial
review is properly the domain of the judicial branch;
execution of contracts is traditionally an executive branch
function. Upon review, the Department of Justice determined
that the bid protest provisions constituted an abridgement
of the separation of powers doctrine and was therefore,
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unconstitutional. In a controversial kickoff for CICA,
President Reagan signed the law, stated his belief that
these provisions were unconstitutional, and directed that
the "Department of Justice inform all executive branch
agencies as soon as possible how they may comply with the
provisions of this bill in a manner consistent with the
constitution" [37:6]. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) issued a noncompliance directive. Congressional
hearings were conducted and lawsuits were filed. After
lengthy maneuvering, Congress outlasted the executive branch
by withholding DOJ operating fund appropriations. In June
1985, all resistance was removed and the act became fully
operative [32:47-51].
6. Predicted Consequences
Writing in a 1985 revision to his text Government
Procurement Management . Stanley Sherman, an experienced
government contracting observer, labeled CICA a "statutory
cornucopia" [1:118]. Sherman offered a number of his own
forecasts about what consequences would be felt as a result
of the new law. Among his many observations Sherman
predicted [1:129]:
First, a number of new statutory administrative
efforts will substantially increase procurement
administrative lead time for competitive negotiation
efforts.
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Second, CICA further complicates the procurement
process rather than simplifying it.
Third, the CICA provision that permits agency heads
to exclude sources when necessary to enhance competition
will, in fact, enhance competition and will concurrently
"stimulate (bid) protests."
Fourth, procurement administrative lead time will
increase somewhat due to bid protest delays.
Two areas were avoided by Sherman. He offered no
opinion about whether CICA will actually increase
competition. Neither does he opine about whether the number
of bid protests will be significant. These omissions are
likely not significant, but rather indicate areas of greater
doubt.
A second author volunteered:
. . . these statutory provisions have the potential for
making bid protests a much more meaningful form of relief
and for encouraging contractors and their attorneys to
file protests more frequently ... of course, this
incentive will only work it the General Accounting Office
awards these with more regularity. [31:7]
Preston suggested that "... the issue of bid protests may
prove to be one of the most litigated areas as a result of
CICA changes" [5:7].
7
. Criticisms in the Literature
Butterfield cited several weaknesses and
inconsistencies in CICA. First, the mandated time limit is
90 days for GAO and 45 days for GSBCA. There is no reason
for the difference since GSBCA must accomplish a more
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complex process. He felt that both should be able to
perform in 60 days. [25:11-12]
Second, Congress intended that continuing
performance costs be eliminated as a problem, but failed to
specifically include such along with "any cost or disruption
for terminating, recompeting, or reawarding" contracts in
those cases where the agency continues contract performance
under the "best interests" standard [25:11], Third, the
statute is "vague on the critical point of whether and to
what extent consideration should be given to intervening
cost and performance factors." Butterfield's recommendation
is that the prohibition against consideration of intervening
events be strengthened and the automatic suspension function
be deleted as an "unnecessary remedy." An absolute
prohibition to GAO against consideration of intervening
events would provide a fair system by "foreclosing the
possibility that intervening events will color or prejudice
the ultimate decision" [25:12].
Preston stated that the CICA legislation affecting
bid protests "was not considered thoroughly before its
adoption." Among her criticisms are the following:
- CICA fails to establish time limits for protests to the
contracting agency;
- the 10 days after award available for protest to the GAO
is not interrupted by an undecided protest to the
contracting agency;
- the provision allowing "a protestor to secure an
injunction of the agency's activities for the price of a
22-cent stamp . . . seems extreme" [5:22-23].
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- difficulties with the new GSBCA forum resulting from a
differing approach and decisions than the GAO;
- imprecise language in the provision that permits
invalidating a procurement for violation of a law or
statute regardless of whether any interested party is
injured; and
- ambiguity in jurisdiction between GAO and GSBCA. [5:6-
8]
Preston recommends that protests after award be held
to the judicial standards in order to gain termination or
that, alternatively, the "protestor be required to reimburse
the government for costs incurred as a result of suspending
performance and defending the protest if the protest is
found without merit" [5:23].
D. SUMMARY
In the problem statement contained in the first chapter,
three elements were stipulated: 1) to define the award
protest system; 2) to determine what CICA altered and why;
and 3) to locate and quantify functional measures of the
process. The reported literature research has addressed the
first two elements.
Furthermore, the literature research has provided
answers to several of the research questions initially
posed.
1. The Causes Leading to CICA
Review of the findings and recommendations of the
COGP study performed in the 1969-1972 period provides a
synopsis of prevailing thinking regarding the GAO bid
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protest process. COGP found an award protest system that
consisted of three processes: contracting agency, GAO and
judicial. The three processes originated separately and
were so poorly integrated that the Study Group members
considered the system "unfair and ineffective." Three major
problems were cited: absence of procedures and remedies
that assure fairness; delays in processing protests; and
lack of a plan to reduce the number of protests. COGP cited
an underlying lack of a comprehensive, coordinated, and
integrated scheme that would unify the overall system in a
manner that would assure fair and equitable treatment for
all protestors. CICA seems to have addressed procedures to
assure fairness and requirements to mitigate the delay, but
nothing in CICA focuses on the matter of reducing the number
of protests nor does the statute address unifying the total
system. Rather, CICA talks only to the GAO (and GSBCA)
forums. The criticism that CICA was not completely thought
through before enactment is all the more poignant.
The contracting agency practice of awarding in the
face of a protest to GAO drew only a modest COGP
recommendation for coordination. Congress obviously thought
the matter deserved more attention.
2 . The Primary Objectives For Sid Protests in CICA
Examination of the legislative history of CICA
provides the answers to this research concern. Foremost,
CICA was intended to be an enforcement mechanism to assure
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that the new emphasis on competitive contracting could be
enforced—especially, by the contracting enterprises of the
private sector. The directive to publish anew GAO bid
protest procedures was one way in which to serve notice to
the private sector that a new spirit prevailed. Making the
system function more efficiently in terms of response time
was a second favorable modification.
A less obvious intent of CICA langauge was to clean
up old business. For fourteen years Congress had not acted
on the COGP recommendations—since the 1972 Final Report.
Without explanation, Congress selected some of the list of
COGP recommendations and included them in the final
compromise legislation while omitting others. CICA included
the COGP recommendations to promulgate GAO procedures;
continued GAO as a forum; established mandatory time limits
for protest resolution; and fixed a requirement to
coordinate decisions in the face of a protest. The
recommendations that Congress chose not to address were
those that specifically involved contracting agency
requirements or integrating contracting agency and GAO
procedures such as, uniform pre-award protest procedures or
annual GAO reviews of agency practices. It is curious that
Congress did not act on the full range of COGP
recommendations
.
The automatic stay and termination provisions were
not recommendations from any organized body. Rather, these
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features seem to be a poorly considered, Congressional
reaction to a symptom identified in committee deliberations.
The intent of these provisions appears more punitive than
effective.
3. The Post CICA GAP Bid Protest Process
Overall, the tri-forum award protest system is
unchanged. All of the changes affect only the GAO bid
protest forum. While COGP recommended two alternative
systems, Congress selected neither and elected to fashion
its own variant of that which already existed.
As directed by CICA, GAO published its award protest
procedures anew. But the procedures differed relatively
little. The definition of interested party might be
slightly more restrictive about who may file a protest, but
if it is, there is little accumulated evidence to date.
Procedures about how and where to file are basically
unchanged.
The most obvious differences are the mandatory time
limits imposed on the agencies and GAO and the automatic
stay provisions. The time limits are now requirements to
the agencies, whereas before they were GAO requests that
were largely ignored. Stay and termination features reflect
the language of CICA directly.
A less obvious feature is the dictate to GAO to
ignore intervening cost and performance factors in deciding
cases that have been awarded in the face of protests.
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Similarly, the recommendations that GAO may now authorize
are somewhat expanded; but the changes are not overwhelming.
Most significant are the requirements that allow GAO to
award bid and proposal costs and attorney fees, which the
agency must take out of appropriation funding.
Nowhere in the literature is the subject of what
happens if the agency chooses to ignore GAO discussed. It
would seem to be a logical offshoot of the constitutionality
issue that surfaces time and again.
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IV. GAP BID PROTEST DATA AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Some of the research questions posed in Chapter I were
resolved during the course of the literature search
described in Chapter III. Responses to the remaining
questions required research, specifically data collection
and analysis that will be described in this chapter and the
next. This chapter specifically addresses GAO measures of
the GAO protest process, while the next treats Navy field
contracting activity data. Both data collection results and
analyses will be addressed in an integrated fashion.
Section B describes what types of data are available.
Section C provides actual GAO data and analysis. As will
become evident, it is convenient to deal with the numerous
statistics in the categories of the systems theory framework
suggested earlier. Specifically, the subsections treat
process inputs, process transform measures, and output
measures. These systems engineering categories simply
provide a mechanism for separating an otherwise cumbersome
amount of data. Section D is a summary.
B. GAO BID PROTEST PROCESS DATA MEASURES
The data source limitations mentioned in Chapter II
dictate a focus on available data, specifically those
statistics used by GAO to manage its own operations. First,
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because GAO data have changed significantly over time in
terms of what is reported, it is important to understand how
these data evolved. Second, the measures actually used for
collection and analysis are summarized. Third, the
fragmented data for the transition year in which CICA was
enacted are discussed.
1. Evolution of the Statistics Reported
a. Pre-CICA Reporting
The level of detail of GAO statistics prior to
CICA was limited, but it evolved significantly after the
early 1970' s. In the opinion of the researcher, the
explanation is an increasing number of contracts which leads
to an increase in award protest volume accompanied by
inevitable Congressional interest generated in response to
constituent concerns and consequent reactive management of
the process. Hence, greater information detail has been
demanded and reported.
In the early 1970' s, GAO reported simply the
number of protests denied and sustained, the number of
formally advertised and negotiated method contracts, and the
number of protests for procuring agencies with the highest
protest activity [7 : 455 : A14 ;7 : 514 : C-ll
.
By FY 73, the following statistics were used by







- protests received and decided before award;
- protests received and decided after award;
- protests received before award and decided after award;
- (cases in which) corrective action recommended;
- corrective action recommended under P.L. 91-510;
- reconsiderations;
- contract cancellation/termination recommended;
- protests where decision rendered;
- withdrawals before decision;
- total protests closed during fiscal year;
- total protests received during fiscal year; and,
- review of awards under grants. [7:775:A-16]
These expanded statistics add some detail, but
the main difference is the introduction of time of decision
measures. Between FY 79 and FY 84, GAO reported values for
each fiscal year plus the prior four years for many of these
measures. This practice was discontinued with the post-CICA
reports.
In its FY 81 report, GAO introduced a new
statistic, the ratio of the number of cases sustained to the
number of cases developed [7 :910: A-13] . This ratio measures
protestor success rate for those cases that are actually
heard. It was intended apparently to be a barometer of
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award protest success rate, in that the "chaff" of early
withdrawals and dismissals is winnowed. The FY 81 report
also added case disposition data, to wit:
- agency adopted GAO recommendation;
- agency proposed alternative action with which GAO
concurred;
- agency rejected recommendation; and,
- agency response not received by close of fiscal year.
[7:39:37-41]
Average time to disposition, average GAO time, decision time
for developed cases, and decision time for summary decision
cases were also introduced. Finally, summary disposition
data for protests by agency were introduced. Rather than an
abbreviated list of agencies experiencing the most protests,
complete agency protest data were provided.
The format was used without change in FY 82, 83,
and 84.
b. Post-CICA Reporting
In a clear break with precedent, the Comptroller
General submitted the FY 85 and FY 86 (i.e., post-CICA)
summary statistics to Congress as well as releasing them.
This was accomplished by marrying the data to the CICA
report required at 31 U.S.C. 3554(e)(2) regarding "each
instance in which a federal agency did not fully implement, a
recommendation . . . during the prior fiscal year" [9:1].
Since Congress never asked for the information, GAO
motivation for submission may subtly serve another purpose.
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The FY 85 report distinctly contrasts data
before and after January 15 while adding the following
information to the growing list:
- contracting agency response time;
- procurement issue areas; and,
- bases for notice dismissal. [9]
The FY 86 report is the latest available. It
provides unprecedented levels of detail generated by an
automated document tracking system installed to cope with
increasing award protest volume which was anticipated to
grow more in consequence of CICA [10].
All of the measures used in FY 85 monitoring
were again reported as well as several new measures such as:
- filing status by defense and civilian agencies;
- measures of continued performance in the face of
protest;
- bases for dismissal after full development;
- bases for dismissal by summary decision;
- bases for dismissal by notice decision; and,
- detailed statistics for selected reporting activity
data. [10:7-25]
In the FY 85 report, GAO introduced a new
statistic, overall protestor effectiveness rate. GAO termed
it " . . .a calculation of the probability that a protestor
obtains meaningful relief" [10:5]. Previously GAO reported
protestor success as the ratio of sustained to developed
cases. This ignored cases withdrawn or dismissed as academic
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for which the contracting agency voluntarily took corrective
action in response to the protest. Thus the new protestor
effectiveness rate measure represents the percentage of
protests filed that result either in voluntary corrective
action by the contracting agency or in a decision sustaining
the protest. Effectiveness data were reported for various
contracting agencies along with summary values. Presumably,
this new statistic is a more accurate measure of the success
achieved by protestors in using the GAO forum.
GAO also included for the first time an analysis
of protest caseload by issues similar to that reported by
ASBCA [7:45:309]
.
Otherwise, the FY-8 6 report continued the trend
of adding information. Analysis of the bases for dismissal
after full development, bases of dismissal by notice
decision, and selected detailed reporting activity data were
appended to those data submitted for FY 85.
2 . Summary of Statistical Measures Available
The various significant performance measures used by
GAO at one time or another during the time period of
interest are summarized in Table 2 . These data comprise a
baseline for data accumulation and provide a starting point
for analysis. Although data values do not exist for some
measures in all reporting years, most have values for the FY
80 to FY 86 period.
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TABLE 2
VARIOUS STATISTICAL MEASURES USED BY GAO
FOR 3ID PROTEST PROCESS PERFORMANCE
INPUT MEASURES






TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION PROCESS MEASURES
FILING STATUS
PROTESTS RECEIVED AND DECIDED BEFORE AWARD
PROTESTS RECEIVED AND DECIDED AFTER AWARD
PROTESTS RECEIVED 3EFORE AWARD AND DECIDED AFTER AWARD
PROCESSING TIME
AVERAGE TIME FOR AGENCY ACTION/RESPONSE
AVERAGE TIME FOR GAO REVIEW AND FINAL DECISION
AVERAGE DISPOSITION TIME
AVERAGE TIME TO DECISION
RATIO OF SUSTAINED TO DEVELOPED CASES
PROTESTOR EFFECTIVENESS RATIO
OUTPUT MEASURES
TOTAL PROTESTS CLOSED DURING FISCAL YEAR
WITHDRAWALS BEFORE DECISION







DETAILED AGENCY PROTEST DATA
AGENCIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF PROTESTS
COMPREHENSIVE AGENCY PROTEST DATA
Source: Developed by Researcher
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At least two measures are clearly not of interest in this
research and are subsequently disregarded. GAO data
reported for corrective action recommended under P.L. 91-510
and matters relating to grants are ignored as beyond the
scope of this research.
3. The Transition Year: FY 85
Government fiscal years begin each October 1, for
example: FY 85 spanned October 1, 1984 to September 30
,
1985. CICA became effective January 15, 1985. Thus FY 85
had two parts; from October 1 to January 15 bid protests
were handled in the pre-CICA manner, while CICA procedures
applied after January 15. GAO reported FY 85 data for three
and one-half months prior to CICA; eight and one-half months
post-CICA; plus FY totals.
Recognizing this fact does not equate with being
able to apply the data clearly. GAO usually reports on an
annual basis without providing monthly data or insight into
month-to-month variations. Mathematically, one can easily
convert the information for the two partial years to twelve
month equivalents. One is then faced with the dilemma of
selecting which of three annual statistics to use for FY 85:
actual, pre-CICA equivalent, or post-CICA equivalent.
This problem recurs throughout the Chapter. The
value of the three possibilities selected depends on the
situation and will be addressed each time it arises.
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C. PRESENTATION OF GAO DATA
1. Introduction
Data for each of the statistics cited in Table 2 are
presented, discussed, and analyzed in the following
sections. These data were derived from multiple references
[7]. In adhering to the analytical framework, the reported
statistics are grouped by natural associations which reflect
the systems theory theme. The twenty-plus statistics
available from GAO are grouped functionally as measures of
bid protest process input; measures of transform process
control; and, measures of output control.
When available, certain baseline data will be
provided from the 1972 COGP Report to provide a reference.
[2,3,4,24]
Although this research is focused on the six years
surrounding CICA enactment, i.e., FY 80 through FY 86, data
collection is expanded when data are available to encompass
the period 1976-1986. This amplification is a consequence
of two factors: first, the data being reported are not
otherwise widely available in contracting literature; and,
second, some analytical methods require a basis greater than
two or three years to ensure real trends rather than short
range anomalies are studied.
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2 . Measures of Bid Protest Process Input
a. Presentation of Primary Data
One fundamental measure of any process is the
volume of system input. Three statistics relate to GAO bid
protest process activity accommodated by GAO: total
protests received; initial protests; and, reconsideration
requests. Additionally, some characteristics of these
inputs received are of interest, so they are reported as
well. The other data associated with process inputs
reported in this section relate to characteristics of the
inputs received: protest issue areas and prospective
contract method segregation.
Total protests received is a gross indicator of
the maximum demand for GAO hearings and decisions. This
summary input measure comprises several components. There
are not only initial protests (as one might guess) , but also
inputs from reconsideration requests. Reconsideration
requests arise 1) when the protestor is dissatisfied with
either a dismissal or denial, or 2) when a contracting
agency desires that a sustained bid protest be heard anew
[8,11]. In addition to initial protests and reconsideration
requests, GAO heard grant protests for several years.
although these are a very small portion of total protests.
COGP reported 1,227 total protests to GAO in FY
72. While COGP was obviously aware of the total protest
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measure, they deemphasized it in their report in favor of
protests decided [24].
Total protests received, initial protests, and
reconsideration requests are presented by fiscal year in
Table 3. Generally, GAO reports values for these data each
fiscal year in unambiguous fashion. Although the initial
protest and reconsideration request data were not reported
in early years, the number of reconsiderations actually
decided was reported. For purposes of completeness,
reconsiderations actually decided are included (with
appropriate notation) in the table as a minimum value for
the reconsideration request statistic.
The total number of protests received includes
all correspondence filed at the GAO associated with a bid
protest, thus it reflects total activity level. GAO
attorneys advised the researcher that the numbers include
all identifiable protests including those that do not
clearly state a cause for protest or are otherwise ambiguous
in intent. If the number is in error, it errs on the high
side.
b. Analysis of Primary Data
(1) Total Protests Received . Since total
protests are a measure of contractor willingness to file
protests, it would be significant if trends differ before
and after CICA. Various methods will be used to try to
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are identifiable: including trend analysis and forecasting
techniques.
One method of examining these data is the
trend analysis provided in Table 4. The first observation
must be that bid protest have increased, more or less
consistently, since 197 at an average of approximately 115
additional protests per year. The annual fluctuations in
numbers and percentages are drastic in both directions.
Generally, the total quantities ebbed slowly from FY 7 6 to
FY 78, turned around in FY 79 and increased substantially
from FY 80 to FY 83. A shift downward occurred in FY 84.
Analysis of FY 85 transition year data is strained. Using
the extrapolated annual rates as sequential data, pre-CICA
FY 85 is an enormous 65% spike, followed by a 17% turn
downward in post-CICA FY 85 and scant 2% growth in FY 86.
Alternatively, we can consider the actual data for the
partial year of input, i.e., pre-CICA values reported for
the 3 1/2 months from October 1 through January 14 plus
post-CICA data for the 8 1/2 month period beginning January
15 and ending September 30. Using actual values, FY 8 5
increased 45% over FY 84 while FY 86 decreased 4% from the
FY 85 level. By comparing the results of the two methods,
it is obvious chat simple percentage growth figures will not
resolve whether a shift occurred concurrent with CICA.
The second analytical approach involves
forecasting methods. If the total protests received are
89
TABLE 4







































ALTERNATIVE: EQUIVALENT TOTAL BID PROTEST TRENDS
84 2,071 -568 -21.52
85 (Pre-CICA) 3,418 +1,347 +65.04
85 (Post) 2,837 1 -579 -16.94
86 1,891 +52 + 1.83
l-FY 84 to FY 85 CICA Rate Change: 37.08%
Source: Calculated by Researcner
considered analogous to product demand, a production and
operations management (POM) framework is suggested. One POM
approach for analysis of input data is demand forecasting.
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Three analytical techniques are commonly used: 1)
regression analysis, 2) moving average method, and 3)
exponential smoothing. Each will be addressed below. [38]
There are two ways to use linear regression
in this situation: 1) the analysis can be done using only
pre-CICA data which provides comparison predictions that lie
outside the range of analysis; or 2) all available data
values can be used to determine predictions within the range
of analysis. Predictions are then contrasted to actual
values. Several alternative calculations were made using
these two methods for the various transition year values.
All have good correlation coefficients, yet none are
outstanding. The forecasts generated by the various
regression analyses are neither consistent nor conclusive.
The predictions are over, under, or near the actual values
depending on the analytical assumptions one chooses. If
forced to select one set of assumptions, the researcher
favors regression of all actual values because it permits
comparisons of predicted and experienced values within the
range of analysis and the correlation coefficient is best at
0.928. Results of this model indicate that FY 85 experience
was 12.4% above expectation and FY 86 experience was 2.4%
over expectations. The coefficient of determination for
this model is 0.8613. This coefficient is a "measure . . .
(of) the percent of variations (of total protests) that is
explained" by the yearly increase. Stated conversely,
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approximately 14% of the increases seen are not a
consequence of routine annual growth. [38:85]
A four year moving average forecast
indicates that actual post-CICA experience significantly
exceeded the forecast values. The exact amount of the
increases depends on the assumptions made in handling the FY
85 transition year data values. The approach favored by the
researcher uses actual annual totals and indicates a 34%
increase in actual FY 85 protests over those predicted plus
a further increase of 10% above prediction in FY 86. One of
the recognized weaknesses of the moving average method is
its tendency to lag changes, so the 34% difference for FY 85
may be overstated somewhat [38:97],
The remaining forecasting technique is
exponential smoothing. Using a commercial software package,
forecasting errors were calculated for various smoothing
constants, which are called alpha values. The most accurate
forecast occurs for alpha equal to 0.8 which indicates the
next forecast value is very highly sensitivity to the error
between forecast and actual value of the most recent period.
The predicted values for FY 85 and FY 86 are 2172 and 2840
respectively, indicating that FY 85 actual experience
exceeded the exponential smoothing predictions by 3 9% and FY
86 experience was also up 2%. These predictions must be
viewed skeptically in face of overall figures of merit for
the model that indicate only fair performance.
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It remains then to correlate the results of
the various methods to establish whether a noticeable shift
occurred in the trends at the time of CICA. The various
forecasts summarized in Table 5 have been combined
subjectively based on limitations and biases inherent in the
various models and with considerations afforded to the
figures of merit for each model.
TABLE 5
CHANGES IN NO. OF TOTAL PROTESTS






Trend Analysis 45.2 3.9 Actual annual
totals




Analysis 12.4 2.4 Model fair




Smoothing 38.5 1.8 Model fair
SUMMARY OPINION +30-35% +2-10%
Source: Calculated by Researcher
The opinion of the researcher is that actual FY 85
experience exceeded the forecast level of protests by
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approximately 30-35%, while FY 86 was 2-10% higher than
predicted. Recalling that the new FAR was implemented in
April 1985, there were two major perturbations that occurred
to Federal procurement in the same fiscal year. The
magnitude of the FY 85 spike is likely an anomaly; real CICA
impact is probably of the order of a 5-10% increase in total
protests. FY 87 data will be essential to confirm whether a
real long term shift has occurred. It must be emphasized
that the various forecasting methods used do not present
compelling evidence.
(2) Initial Protests Received . Initial
protests received are the dominant component of the total
protests received and may be the only true measure of
external input. The numbers of initial protests received by
GAO have been reported only subsequent to FY 81. Between FY
81 and FY 86, initial protests averaged 92.5% of total
protests. Presumably, the volume of initial protests should
be a function of factors such as the number of Government
contract solicitations; the quality of Government
solicitations; contractor awareness of the bid protest
process; and contractor expectations of the process.
Secondary determinants for some of these factors can also be
postulated; for example, the quality of Government
solicitations can be influenced by adequate numbers of
contracting personnel, the experience and learning levels of
such individuals, or instabilities resulting from
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legislative or regulatory changes. These factors that
affect the number of initial protests should be entirely
external to the protest process. Therefore, initial
protests may actually be a better measure of system demand
than the aggregate total and may provide a more accurate
indication of a change in protestor activity.
One significant secondary determinant of
the contractor expectation factor is the contractor's
perception of his potential for successful remedy.
Contractors presumably base their decision to protest on a
business judgment of the likelihood of success, the cost to
protest, and the time needed to protest. Pro forma protests
which have only cathartic value reflect bad business
decisions that will be rare events and can be discounted in
terms of significant numbers of inputs. One of the
presumptions of CICA must have been that contractor
expectations would be raised by the new procedures.
Analysis of initial protest data duplicates
the methods that were used for total protests. A trend
analysis is provided in Table 6. By inspection, the data
are erratic in size and direction. Various regression
analyses were attempted as before to accommodate the
transition year data problem mentioned previously. The
preferred regression model uses actual annual totals but
still has a poor correlation coefficient, 0.655. According
to this model, the increase in FY 85 was 8.8% above
95
TABLE 6



































1FY 84 to FY 85-CICA Change: 28.2





prediction and FY 86 actual values fell below expectation by
2.4%. The associated coefficient of determination is
0.4296, so the model is not reliable. A four quarter moving
average forecast of actual annual totals shows an unexpected
rise of 27% in FY 85 followed by another 8% increase in FY
86. The performance of the moving average model is fair.
Efforts to develop an adequate exponential smoothing model
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were unsuccessful. The large annual swings in opposite
directions leads to a large cumulative deviation figure of
merit.
Results are summarized in Table 7. It is
the researcher's opinion that initial protests increased 27-
35% above expectations in FY 85 and 2-3% above a reasonable
forecast for FY 86. Comparing these ranges to the
corresponding shifts in the total protests received, one
concludes that the results are consistent with the fact that
the majority of total protests are initial protests.
TABLE 7
CHANGES IN INITIAL PROTESTS






Trend Analysis +39.8 -5.8 Actual annual
totals




Analysis + 8.8 -2.4 Poor model
Moving Average +26.9 +8.1 Fair model
Exponenenrial
Smoothing N/A N/A Inadequate
Summary Opiniorl + 27-35 + 2-3
Source: Developed by Researcher
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(3) Requests for Reconsideration . Reconsidera-
tion requests, presented in Table 3, can be viewed as
process feedback. Prior to CICA, reconsideration requests
involved approximately 6% of total protests. They originate
when cases are. dismissed during development, when cases are
summarily dismissed, or when cases are denied or sustained,
i.e., a decision is rendered. Reconsideration requests
should be dominated by factors internal to the bid protest
process such as dismissal rates, denial rates, or sustain
rates. Therefore, they should reflect process functioning
largely to the exclusion of external influences such as
protestor's willingness to protest.
The sole exception would be a major
external change to the protest process such as that
resulting from CICA. In that event, the changed system
could be expected to create different feedback values. In
fact, reconsideration requests doubled to approximately 12%
after CICA. This shift indicates some fundamental process
change. Further speculation is unwarranted absent
additional data.
3 . Secondary Data and Analysis
a. Issue Area Statistics
(1) Data . GAO introduced a profile of stated
protest issues with their FY 85 report to Congress. The
report noted these data were not readily available in the
past but are instead a beneficial byproduct of a
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computerized case tracking system introduced to help cope
with a growing workload.
For the portion of FY 85 and all of FY 86
under CICA, GAO reported statistics for the issue areas
addressed on the protestor initial statement [9 : Bl ; 10 : 12 ]
.
Although the actual data reflect percentages of protest
cases closed rather than cases received, they are reported
in Table 8 as more representative of process input
characteristics than output measures.
TABLE 8
ISSUE AREAS CITED BY PROTESTORS FOR FULLY DEVELOPED CASES
ISSUE AREA
Procurement was improperly sole source
Solicitation was defective
Protestor's offer was improperly rejected
Awardee's offer improperly accepted
Selection methodology was otherwise
improper
Protestor says it was unjustifiably
found to be not responsible
Protestor says awardee was not
responsible
Protestor raises other issues or
states no issue
PERCENTAGES













Source: Compiled from references 9 and 10 by the
Researcher
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The lack of pre-CICA data obviates
comparisons, however COGP did look at the causes of bid
protests during their study. They analyzed 1050 bid pro-
tests from 15 agencies including protests to the contracting
agency and to the GAO. COGP found 3 0% of the protests
"challenged adequacy or legality of the IFB or the solicita-
tion" [24:A-17]. Responsiveness of the awardee issues were
raised in 29% of the cases. Bidder responsibility disputes
affected another 13% and the balance of 28% of protests
concerned other challenges including, "ambiguous or
restrictive specifications, evaluation criteria, mistake in
bid, and set aside procedures." These COGP data provide an
useful baseline from which to assay CICA performance.
(2) Analysis of Issues Raised . GAO stated that
the data:
. . . indicates that a large portion of FY 1985 CICA cases
were filed by firms that. . . were complaining either of
the rejection of their offer or of the acceptance of a
competitor's offer. A significant number of complaints
dealt with alleged solicitation defects. Only a few . . .
sought to overturn improper sole-source awards, a result
that is consistent with earlier GAO studies. [9:5]
In FY 86 GAO surmised that the ". . .
issues relating to the selection of an awardee continue to
predominate, while issues such as alleged improper use of
noncompetitive procurement techniques appear relatively
infrequently" [10:5].
Comparison of the COGP data and the post-
CICA GAO experience is complicated because the COGP data
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categories do not correlate well. The GAO issue categories
for improper sole source and complaints that the bidder's
offer was improperly accepted could be allocated to either
of two COGP pool categories.
At face value, only two COGP pools can be
matched to GAO data. COGP found that the responsiveness of
another bid or offer was at issue 29% of the time; GAO found
the complaint that the awardee' s offer was improperly
accepted 12-16.4%. The second match occurs in challenges of
the responsibility of the awardee: COGP found 13% while GAO
found only 2.6-2.9%. But the obvious conclusion that
percentage of protests challenging awardee competence or
proposals has fallen is suspect for two reasons. First,
COGP considered contracting agency protests as well as the
GAO appeals, and second COGP data may well reflect
percentages of protests received, whereas GAO addresses
cases closed. Given the irreconcilable differences, it is
difficult to impute what changes, if any, have actually
occurred.
One conclusion is possible from the GAO
data at hand. If protestors are stating their true
motivation and only a few protestors (2.5%) are complaining
of improper sole source awards, the data indicate that the
bid protest process is seldom used to compel greater
competition. There should be no reason for protestors to
disguise the reason for a good-faith protest; in fact, they
101
risk rejection of their complaint if no reason or an invalid
reason is stated. Therefore, it can be assumed that reasons
stated by protestors are real
.
If the intent of incorporating of bid
protest reform legislation as part of CICA was to use the
bid protest process to enforce CICA, the resultant effect
has been marginal at best and the legislation has failed.
An alternative hypothesis would be that
CICA provided a vehicle to which bid protest reform
legislation could be appended. The practice of combining
unrelated legislation is common in the U.S. Congress,
especially where the dominant legislation has strong appeal
and the "rider" legislation has a only a small constituency
or is otherwise so neutral that separate passage is
unlikely. The alternative hypothesis would likely not incur
any significant increase in protests to enforce competition.
Recalling that these data are related to
the total number of protests received, one might reasonably
question whether the ratios hold uniformly throughout the
process, e.g., of those cases in which a protest is
sustained, what is the issue raised?
b. Contract Method Statistics
(1) Data . Other GAO statistics track whether a
sealed bid or competitive proposals contract method was
associated with a protest. The GAO data are limited to
102
protests in which a decision was rendered. 1 Notwithstand-
ing the limitation, the statistic is an input measure
characteristic and is therefore reported in this section.
These data are summarized in Table 9.
The reader might expect the sum of sealed
bid and competitive proposals methods figures to equal the
number of protests. The small differences reflect protests
of small purchases, scheduled procurements and other,
seldom-used contract methods.
GAO does not make any distinction between
full and open competition and other that full and open
competition in competitively negotiated cases.
Consequently, it is not possible to contrast competitive and
noncompetitive award protest experience.
(2) Analysis . The percentage of formal
advertisements protested averaged 58.55% (with a standard
deviation of 5.91%) for the period FY 76-86. The percentage
of competitive negotiations averaged 41.15% (with a standard
deviation of 5.28). The tight variances reflect stability
over the time period involved. Until FY 86, more formal
advertisements were protested than negotiations. In FY 86,
the numbers were nearly equal, but negotiations led slightly
for the first rime.
1The reader should recall that sealed bid method is the
post-CICA term for advertised procurement and the term
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No conclusions are evident from this data,
beyond a guess that the shift in emphasis contained in CICA
that affords competitive negotiation equal favor with sealed
bidding may have shifted some marginal contracts from one
method to another and that these marginal solicitations were
the ones drawing protests.
4 . Measures of Bid Protest Process Transformation
Function
If one considers the GAO bid protest process as an
unspecified relationship of observable inputs and outputs,
the input and output characterize a process transformation
function that can be measured and analyzed. Two classes of
measures exist: one type is the time aspects of the
process; a second type concerns the output to input ratio or
efficiency.
a. Case Processing Time Measures
Case processing procedure has not changed as a
result of CICA. After a protest is received, GAO notifies
the agency and an agency response is prepared. When GAO
gets the agency package, they may hold hearings with the
protestor or may simply proceed to a decision. To the
extent that a protestor has knowledge of what is in the
agency package, he may be permitted access and be allowed no
submit a response. What CICA changed was the time allowed
to notify the agency (1 day) ; the time allowed for agency







Case processing time was one aspect of the GAO
process that COGP criticized in 1972. The COGP source data
provide an interesting baseline from which to compare CICA
performance. Average processing time in days as reported by
COGP are as follows:
Ave. Agency Ave. GAO Total Processing




For the same period, Department of the Navy
cases were processed in 4 6.7 days at the agency, 38.8 at
GAO, and a total average processing time of 91.5 days [24].
Subsequent to COGP, GAO tracked and reported
case processing time for bid protests to "minimize the
disruption to government procurement due to delay while
protest are decided" [10:11]. Processing time is measured
using four statistics:
- average disposition time—all cases;
- average contracting agency time;
- average protest disposition time; and
- average developed protest disposition time.
For the years FY 81 through FY 84, GAO also
reported the following average time measures:
- GAO time (for protest disposition)
;
- GAO time (for developed protests disposition)
;
- agency time (for developed protests disposition)
;
- other time (for developed protests disposition)
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- time for total protest withdrawn; and,
- time for total protests closed without decision.
Contracting agency time is the average time, in
Federal Government working days, required by agencies to
file reports with GAO. Protest disposition time reflects
the average elapsed time (again, in Federal Government
working days) from filing to closing. It does not include
reconsideration request times. Developed protest
disposition time is the average number of Government working
days from filing to decision for initial protests decided on
merits. Finally, disposition time for all cases reflects
the average number of Government working days from filing to
decision for both initial protests and reconsideration
requests. These values are presented in Table 10.
It requires no elegant calculations to observe
that the average time for agency response changed very
little from the early 1970 performance that COGP observed
until CICA, when a dramatic drop to a number slightly less
than the CICA mandated requirement occurred. GAO processing
time varied somewhat over the years but has held close to a
forty-day period. Little change is observable with CICA.
The shift in agency response time accounts for nearly all of
the observable shift in developed protest disposition time,
but average disposition time has fallen further still. The
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summary decisions are delivered earlier than in pre-CICA
days. The CICA power granted to GAO to dismiss immediately
cases that lack merit on their face results in significant
time savings by avoiding full development. Since a large
number of cases are handled in this manner, the effect on
the average is significant.
GAO is justifiably proud of the fact that no
protest has required more than the 90 days stipulated in the
Act [9,10]. Case processing time is one statistic that has
changed unambiguously in consequence to CICA. The
improvement is nearly one-half the time required before
CICA. The shortened time period is inherently more fair,
and it also permits more effective remedies.
b. Measures of Filing Status
A second set of time measures are titled "filing
status." GAO regularly collects data concerning when
contract award occurs relative to each associated protest.
Three measures are used:
- protests received and closed before award;
- protests received and closed after award; and,
- protest received before award and closed after award.
Although pre-CICA reports present raw numbers . the
values reported in Table 11 are percentages that have been
calculated. Subcategories for each statistic provide
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Prior to CICA, an average 36.5% of cases were
received and closed before award; 52.4% were received and
closed after award; and 11.1% were received before but
closed after award. No discernible trends in the year to
year experience existed. In roughly 63% o'f cases, no
protest decision was rendered until after contract award.
CICA specifically set out to correct the post
award decision problem. After CICA, the received before but
closed after award average fell to 2.7%. This change
reflects the impact of the automatic stay provision of CICA
that makes such an event less likely.
The percentage of protests received after award
still remains in the 50% range. Cases received before award
that now incur the stay of award have migrated to the
decided before award category.
The conclusions are clearly that the stay
feature is functioning since more cases filed before award
are being resolved before award, but that no shift in
protestor behavior leading to earlier protests has
accompanied the change.
c. Transformation Efficiency
Output to input ratios are usually referred to
as process efficiency. Arguably, they can be considered
output statistics.
When a protest is lodged with GAO there are
several alternatives of what might occur next. A large
111
number of protests are withdrawn and many more are
"filtered" so that they never reach the decision step.
Filtering can occur in situations where GAO closes the case
without decision. If the contracting agency cancels the
protested solicitation, GAO may dismiss the protest as
academic. A number of cases are also rejected for reasons
such as jurisdiction matters , untimely protest, or a protest
not conforming to GAO procedures. Thus, it makes sense to
look at the ratio of cases culled out and at how many reach
the full development step.
If the protest survives the filtering, three
outcomes are possible. GAO may find for the protestor and
sustain the protest; it may find for the Government and deny
the protest; or it may dismiss the protest as not meriting
further hearing. To complicate matters, GAO can mix these
decisions in almost any fashion.
The statistic used by GAO for many years has
been the ratio of sustained to developed cases. This
statistic is the clearest measure of protestor success. GAO
started reporting sustained to developed case ratios in FY
81 as part of detailed agency statistics. The values
reported for all agencies have ranged from 11.2% to 18.7%
with an average of 15..2%. Although post-CICA FY 85 was very
high, FY 86 fell to 13.8% and no discernable difference
exists in the before and after CICA data. (For comparison,
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Department of the Navy experience for the same period ranged
from 7.9% to 17.0% with an average of 13%.)
Recently, GAO has introduced the protestor
effectiveness rate to adjust the sustained to developed
ratio for protests that actually achieve protestor
satisfaction but are withdrawn or dismissed as academic
before reaching the fully developed step. In GAO words:
The protestor effectiveness rate is calculated by
projecting the total number of cases closed (through
withdrawal of as academic) due to voluntary agency
corrective action, by adding protests sustained and by
dividing the sum by the number of cases filed. The result
is then expressed as a percentage. . . . The results
reported do not include cases where protests were
abandoned as a result of actions taken by the contracting
agency; moreover, the rates are based on the number or
protests closed and not the number of procurements
affected. More than 10 per cent of all procurements
protested are subject to multiple protests, often with the
protestors seeking incompatible forms of relief.
Consideration of these factors would add to the totals
reported. [9:F1]
GAO protestor effectiveness rates were reported
for only the post-CICA periods: all agencies averaged 14.8%
in FY 85 and 2 4.3% in FY 86. However, the post-CICA data
contained in the GAO annual reports are not auditable and
appear to be overstated. Attempts to retrospectively
calculate these rates using GAO data to verify reported
protestor effectiveness rates failed. For example, the
calculated values for FY 35 and FY 36 are 15.3% and 17.4%.
Furthermore, the component data needed to calculate pre-CICA
values are not reported, so comparisons of pre- and post-
CICA performance are not possible.
113
5. Measures of Bid Protest Process Output
a. Bid Protests Closed
The number of cases closed each fiscal year is
the general measure of output activity. Because of the time
lag between protest or reconsideration request and final
disposition, a number of cases are in process at the close
of each fiscal year. Thus, the total of protests decided
does not match the total of protests received in any given
year. However, over the long term all cases will be closed
in some fashion or other, so the real output rate is 100% of
all input cases.
In the same way that cases received can be
subdivided, the cases closed statistic comprises initial
protests and reconsideration requests. Initial protests are
the lion's share, averaging 92.5% of cases closed. These
data are provided in Table 12
.
Bid protests closed represent the total workload
accomplished by the GAO Office of General Counsel staff for
each year. However, as will be seen, the amount of effort
involved in closing these cases varies widely. The measure
portrays only that, over time every protest filed with GAO
will be closed by one of several ways? it has limited
usefulness to this research.
b. Disposition of Cases Closed
Initial protests can be closed by: 1) withdraw-
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provides data showing the number of initial protests closed
by each of these methods for the period FY 76 to FY 86. By
inspection, it is evident that the percentage of withdrawals
has remained stable at approximately 2 to 2 5% before and
after CICA. The percentage of cases decided has fallen
since CICA from a stable 50-55% range to 30%, while
percentage of non-decisions rose from 20-25% to 50%. The
change and the reasons for it will be discussed further
below.
(1) Withdrawals . Withdrawals are a significant
fraction of the total number of protests filed; between FY
76 and FY 86 withdrawals averaged 25% of ^initial protests
closed. Withdrawal action can occur at any time in the
decision process and can be for either a known or unknown
reason. Available data are provided in Table 14. For those
limited years in which withdrawal reasons have been
reported, approximately two-thirds are for a known reason
and roughly one-half are due to agency corrective action.
No discernible difference is evident before and after CICA.
(2) Protest Decisions . Many cases are closed
by decision, including summary decisions and decisions on
the merits. Over the period FY 76 to FY 86, an average of
53.2% of initial protests closed have been decided, as shown
in Table 13.
The decision process follows published GAO




Fiscal Year 83 84 85 85 CICA 86
Total Withdrawals 579 493 191 236 536
Reason Known N/A 318 N/A 172 328
Percentage N/A 64.5 N/A 72.9 61.2
Reason Unknown N/A 175 N/A 64 208
Percentage N/A 35.5 N/A 27.1 38.8
Corrective
Action N/A 230 N/A 141 273
Percentage N/A 46.7 N/A 59.7 50.9
Source: Compiled by Researcher [7]
the time the protest is received, the agency prepares a
report, the protestor submits comments and conferences are
held as appropriate. Based on the "fully developed" record,
a decision is rendered: the protest is either sustained,
denied, or dismissed. In some instances where multiple
issues are involved in the protest, a mixture of decisions
can result including; denial in part and dismissal in part,
sustain in part and dismissal in part, denial in part and
sustain in part, and denial in part, sustain in parr, and
dismissal in part. Mixed decisions introduce an unwelcome
complexity to the statistics.
The subject of sustained decisions as a
fraction of cases developed was discussed, supra, under the
118
topic of process transformation measures. Dismissals
however, deserve further discussion. Dismissals can occur
after the agency submits its report which is termed partial
development, or after the full record has been obtained,
termed full development. GAO addressed the topic in the FY
86 report:
A significant number of protests raise issues that are
clearly without merit on their face, that concern matters
•chat are appropriate for handling by GAO under its bid
protest function, or that are not timely raised or
otherwise do not conform to the bid protest regulations.
Such issues are dismissed: (1) by decision after full
development in cases where the facts are not apparent
until a complete record is made or where other issues
raised are suitable for decision on their merits, (2) by
summary decision, where full development is not required
but an explanation tailored to the specific facts of a
case is required to explain the decision, and (3) by
notice decision. Notice decisions are machine generated
standardized form notices that have been developed for use
in a variety of standard situations. [10:16]
Summary decisions are:
. . . issued on the basis of the initial record made by
the protestor in cases where a report was not requested
from the contracting activity or where such a report was
requested but it was possible to issue a decision before
the report was received. [7:39:39]
These summary decisions were considered dismissals.
Consequently, before CICA all dismissals—whether summary
decisions or decision on the merits of fully developed
cases—were scored as dismissals and cases decisions.
Prior to CICA, the notice decision
alternative did not exist. With the enactment of CICA, the
Comptroller General gained tacit authorization "to dismiss
any protest determined to be frivolous or which, on its
119
face, does not state a valid basis for protest" (31 U.S.C.
3554 (a)(2)}. This authority basically recognizes the way
GAO handled non-decisions prior to CICA, but by making it
explicit, GAO is able to dismiss many protests earlier in
the process thus eliminating wasted effort. By way of
implementing this authority, GAO established a new class of
outcome called notice decisions. Concurrent with CICA, GAO
installed a computerized case tracking system that was able
to produce the form notices. GAO calls this feature "speedy
dismissal.
"
Subsequent to CICA, all summary decision
and notice decision dismissals have been moved to the
category "closed without decision." This bookkeeping shift
alone accounts for the changes subsequent to CICA in the
percentage of cases decided and percentage of cases closed
without a decision.
Disposition decision data are provided in
Table 15.
By inspection, the number and percentage of
summary decisions have risen drastically since CICA. The
number of cases decided on the merits has been relatively
flat, but the corresponding percentage has fallen with the
increase in total initial protests decided. If dismissals
were reallocated to decisions in the FY 86 data, the
percentage of non-decisions would fall to 21.8 and
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closely parallels the pre-CICA averages. Thus, it can be
concluded that the number of cases decided on the merits has
not shifted as a result of CICA.
One interesting observation of the
disposition data is the fact that the percentage of cases
sustained may have risen slightly in the post-CICA reporting
periods.
(3) Protests Closed Without a Decision . A
significant percentage of cases are closed without a
decision, as is shown in Table 13. On average, 20.5% of
initial protests closed before CICA were concluded in this
fashion.
Closing a case without decision prior to
CICA involved ending it "without action" or by "nondecision
letter." Nondecision letters were issued to the protestor
where GAO encountered unusual circumstances [11]. A common
situation resulting in this end involved a contracting
agency action that rendered a protest decision meaningless
or "academic." The agency could terminate the solicitation
or might make contract award to the protestor who lodged the
protest prior to award. Absent a formal withdrawal by the
protestor, GAO would close the case by letter. As stated
above, this category now includes all notice decisions and
summary decisions, i.e., dismissals.
Part of the flood of post-CICA data
reporting includes statistical analysis of the reasons for
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dismissals: by notice decision, by summary decision, and
after full development. This information is presented in
Tables 16, 17, and 18, respectively. Since pre-CICA
comparison data are unavailable, evaluation of the impact of
CICA is meaningless.
(4) Reconsideration Requests . Reconsideration
requests can be closed by another formal decision or without
decision. The formal decision can either reverse or uphold
the original decision. As the data in Table 19 show, only a
very few cases achieve a reversal. The only change apparent
with CICA is that most cases are being closed by formal
decision rather than without decision. This may also be due
to the computerized notice generation capability in the
post-CICA environment.
c. Contract Stays and Terminations
(1) Award Suspension Data . In the report for
FY 86 bid protest activity, GAO introduced data "regarding
the relative frequency of award in the face of protest"
[10:13]. No similar data were presented for the part of FY
85 affected by CICA and award suspensions were not required
prior to CICA. In FY 86, defense agencies awarded contracts
in 5.5% of the cases where the initial protest was received
before award. During the same period civilian agencies








BASES FOR NOTICE DISMISSALS
Bases
Abandoned cases
No basis of protest was stated
Protest was not filed within 10 working
days after basis was known 5.6 9.3
Protest concerning the citation was
filed after opening data 7.1 8.9
Protester challenged affirmative
determination of responsibility 5.8 8.7
Protest raised issues that SBA decides 9.0 6.4
Protester failed to furnish copy of
protest to contracting agency 13.1 6.3
Agency level protest was not timely
protested to GAO 4.6 6.3
Issue protested was matter of contract
administration 4.8 5.7
Protester was not an interested party
as defined by CICA 4.2 3.3
Protest concerned wage rate matters for
review by Department of Labor 2.2 1.4
Protest raised issues that were outside
GAO's CICA jurisdiction 4.2 2.4

















aProtest raises an issue that is of only theoretical
interest, not an issue of practical importance to the
procurement protested.
(2) Performance Suspension Data . As was the
case for award suspension data, suspension of performance
when a bid protest is lodged after award is a CICA
provision. GAO did not report statistics for the part of FY
85 affected. FY 86 data for cases where the agency invoked
the statutory procedure to permit continued performance in
the face of the protest are summarized in Table 20.
d. GAO Recommendations
Prior to CICA, GAO provided numbers of cases in
which corrective action was recommended and the number of
cases where contract cancellation or termination was
recommended. These data have been discontinued in the
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TABLE 18









aIssue concerns a firm's (other than the protester's)
capability to perform if awarded a contract. GAO will
consider questions relating to whether a firm has obli-
gated itself to perform, but does not normally consider
allegations that an agency should disqualify an offeror
because of concern that it may not meet its
obligations.
^GAO will not consider a protest where the matter is
pending before a court of competent jurisdiction,
unless the court expresses an interest in GAO '
s
decision.
cConcerns issues falling outside GAO's bid protest
jurisdiction as defined by CICA, 31 U.S.C. § 3551,
et seq.
^GAO does not consider issues which by law fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Business
Administration
.
aProt:ests filed by potential subcontractors are normally
not for consideration by GAO under CICA.
^Concerns issues that have not been protested within the




Fiscal Year 81 82 83 84 85 85CICA 86
Decisions reversed 6 3 2 3 14 8
Decisions not reversed 88 130 110 118 N/A N/A 3 05
Not decided 1 34 26 13 48 203 51
TABLE 20
CONTINUED PERFORMANCE IN FACE OF PROTEST
Protests Rec'd Defense Civilian Combined
after Award Agencies Agencies Agencies
Where agency determined
that urgency justified
continued performance 16 14 30
Where agency found that
continued performance
was in the Government's
best interest 7 13 20
Continued Performance in Face of Protest (Sustain Data)
Where agency determined
that urgency justified
continued performance 3 2 5
Where agency found that
continued performance
was in the Government *
s
best interest 1 3 4
post-CICA reports without explanation. The omission is
serious from the point of view of the research since no
comparisons are possible.
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One of the provisions of CICA previously
described requires that GAO submit an annual report to
Congress of all situations in which the contracting agency
fails to implement the GAO recommendation. Three cases have
been reported to date: two in FY 85 and one in FY 86. It
is of passing interest that two of the three have been
Department of the Navy actions, but is otherwise not
relevant to the topic.
6. Department of the Navy Data
Greater levels of detail are available as a result
of the GAO automated bid protest tracking system implemented
concurrent with CICA. For FY 86 GAO provided detailed
tabulated breakdown data on a "reporting activity basis tied
to agencies' GAO contact points for receipt of protests and
report filing purposes" [10:21]. Department of the Navy
data are provided in Table 21. These data will prove to be
a useful link to the next chapter.
D. SUMMARY
The GAO bid protest process receives an input of nearly
3000 protests annually; approximately 92.5% of each year's
protests are new. Although the number of protests varies
widely each year, over the long term it has continued to
grow at a rate of 115 per year. Roughly one-half of the
protests involved sealed bid method contracts, while the
other half are protests of competitive negotiations.
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competition i.e., sole source issues; the majority are
complaints that the protestor was treated unfairly or that
the awardee received favored treatment.
CICA seems to have caused an approximate 10-15% increase
in the total and initial numbers of protests received over
the long haul; reconsideration requests also doubled. But a
pronounced jump in these measures in FY 85 seems to be an
anomaly related to other factors as well as CICA
—
possibly
the shift from DAR and FPR to FAR that coincided. The
balance of sealed bid to competitive negotiations shifted to
slightly in favor of competitive negotiations with CICA. To
the extent that Congress intended that the bid protest
process be used to enforce competition, the legislation has
failed; there is no major increase in protests and no
increase in the number of sole source contracts cited in
protests
.
Where CICA has had a decided effect is process time.
COGP cited the 90 days required in 1970 as unsatisfactory;
by 1984 this had grown to an average of 123.3 days for
developed cases. Since CICA, no case has taken more than 90
days and average time for all protests is now only 31.3
days; developed cases require 65.9 days on average. The
improvements can be attributed almost entirely to
contracting agency compliance with the mandated 25 days for
response to GAO and the new GAO power to dismiss
unmeritorious cases in a speedy manner.
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Statistics that reflect time of decision and time of
filing show that more cases are being decided prior to
award; therefore, the assumption must be that protestors are
no longer precluded for fair remedies by late decisions on
the average. Still, protestor behavior remains unchanged
regarding the time of filing; in half the cases no protest
was filed until after award. To the extent that protestors
have gained better access to all possible remedies, the
process is improved.
Protestor effectiveness has not improved in terms of the
ratio of sustained to developed cases; GAO has introduced a
new statistic intended to demonstrate an obvious fact that
protestors are gaining their desired goals in a greater
number of cases but the measure is ambiguous.
In terms of changes in the protest process output, the
fact that nearly 2 5% of initial protests are withdrawn
before decision has not changed with CICA. It is clear that
roughly one-half of those withdrawals are related to agency
actions that make the protest effective. Combining the two
averages means that nearly 12.5% of initial protests filed
result in agency action that satisfied the protestor. One-
third of the withdrawals are for unknown reasons. Some
proportion of these must also be protestor successes.
Meanwhile, approximately 15% of the average 53% of
initial protests closed by decision result in sustained
decisions. Stated differently, approximately 7.5% of
131
initial protests are decided in favor of the protestor. The
percentage sustained may have increased with CICA, but if
so, the change is marginal. The number of cases closed
without decision has not changed significantly, but
bookkeeping alterations cloud that fact.
Combining the success rate related to withdrawals and
that related to sustained decisions indicates that
protestors are successful no less than 20% of the time.
This percentage is understated by the withdrawals that are
recorded as withdrawn for unknown reasons which relate to
protestor success plus any dismissals that might be
successes. The reasons for dismissal given in the FY 86 GAO
report tend to minimize the importance of dismissals,
however. Furthermore, as GAO observed, multiple protests
filed on the same contract or solicitation can dilute the
percentage as well.
One of the disappointments of the research is that so
little data are available regarding the protest stay and
termination features. To the extent that the filing status
measures show that fewer protests are being decided after
award, it can be assumed that the features are effective.
Beyond that inference, all other observations from the GAO
data are speculation.
Thus, several of the original research questions have
been addressed in this Chapter on GAO bid protest process
performance, including queries regarding what the GAO bid
132
protest process is and how it has changed; what the
principal management control measures are, and the extent to
which the stay and termination provisions have been




V. NAVY FIELD ACTIVITY DATA AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter addresses data collection and analysis from
selected Navy Field Contracting activities. Five
organizations were targeted: Navy Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) , Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) , Navy Regional
Contracting Center (NRCC) Philadelphia, NRCC Long Beach, and
NRCC Washington, DC. As mentioned in Chapter II, these
activities were chosen with the expectation that their broad
range of contract actions and large business volume would
impart significance.
Section B of this Chapter addresses the content and
analysis of data collected relating to the enumerated field
activities' post-CICA protest activity. Section C addresses
an effort to correlate this data with contract action
reporting information reports. Section D explores the
results of personnel interviews conducted with individuals
at the five activities. Finally, Section E is a summary.
B. FIELD ACTIVITY BID PROTEST DATA
Data requests were mailed to selected individuals in
each of the five field activities involved. The list of
data sought appears in Table 22. Additionally, a request
was also submitted to the parent activity, the Naval Supply




TOTAL NUMBER CONTRACT ACTIONS
NO. FORMALLY ADVERTISED/SEALED BID
NO. NEGOTIATED/COMPETITIVE PROPOSALS
TOTAL NUMBER OF CONTRACTING OFFICER PROTESTS RECEIVED
NO. FORMAL ADVERTISED/SEALED BID
NO. NEGOTIATED/COMPETITIVE PROPOSALS
BREAKOUT BY CONTRACT FOR GOODS OR SERVICES
COMMODITY AREA
TOTAL NUMBER OF GAO BID PROTESTS RECEIVED
NO. FORMALLY ADVERTISED/SEALED BID
NO. NEGOTIATED
BREAKOUT BY CONTRACT FOR GOODS OR SERVICES
COMMODITY AREA
NO. CASES PREPARED












RECOMMENDATION COMPLIED/NOT COMPLIED WITH
Source: Developed by Researcher
obtained in response to the query. As will become evident,
the data are not: conclusive, but taken together they provide
an interesting picture.
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1. Department of the Navy Bid Protests to GAP
As was discussed in Chapter IV. C. 6, GAO began
reporting greater detail for agency protests in its FY 86
report. The information reported about the Department of
the Navy was presented in Table 21.
For FY 86 NAVSUP was involved in 245 of 487, or
50.3%, of Navy cases. NAVSUP total protests were nearly
double those of the next largest activity, the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command. This leadership position
—
while a dubious distinction for NAVSUP—broadly supports the
decision to use NAVSUP as the bellwether Systems Command for
this research.
To reiterate the contents of the report, according
to GAO NAVSUP' s FY 86 performance resulted in 87 withdrawals
and 50 merit decisions. Six of the 50 decided cases were
sustained for a 12% sustained to developed case ratio. GAO
reported protestor effectiveness at 38.1%, however the
accuracy of this figure cannot be confirmed with the data
provided.
Concurrent with the implementation of CICA, the
staff of the Secretary of the Navy established an interim
requirement that reports called Bid Protest Action Reports
(RCS DD-DDR&E(AR) 1669) be prepared and submitted at the
conclusion of each GAO or GSBCA protest. At the time of
writing, ASN staff were accumulating the reports and summary
statistics but no higher level review was occurring.
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Tables 23 and 24 provide draft summary statistics
obtained from ASN,S&L for calendar years 1985 and 1986,
respectively. These data reflect the number of Bid Protest
Action Reports that had been received by ASN by April 1987.















Source: ASN,S&L draft data
The obvious difference of calendar year rather than fiscal
year totals complicates comparison. Other subtleties such
as whether GAO and ASN accumulate their statistics on the
basis of protest filing date, protest decision date, or Bid
137
TABLE 24












Source: ASN,S&L draft data
Protest Action Report date make correlation of the two data
sets impossible at the summary level and extremely difficult
at a case level . What can be stated is that the ASN summary
data address over 400 protests of a total of 789 post-CICA
Navy cases counted by GAO. The percentage is sufficient to
trust the ASN data as a reasonable sample, although
statistical significance would undoubtedly be weak.
Part of the disparity in total numbers is due to a
lag in reporting by some activities, which probably results
from a low level of attention. Since the Reports are not
receiving high level scrutiny, they are not given much
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emphasis. This indifference may be entirely appropriate
since management of bid protest statistics is unrelated to
avoiding or resolving protests.
The ASN data sample indicates that the Navy
experienced sustained protests 22 times in 408 protests
lodged, or at a rate of 5.4%. The comparable GAO rate is
3.0%, so the ASN data may be biased in favor of the more
developed cases. NAVSUP experience is 5 sustained decisions
in 223 cases, or a 2.2% rate. Since there are no
indications of major discrepancies between the NAVSUP
experience and the GAO figures, the assumption that the
Reports are a reasonable sample is supported by the overall
GAO data.
2 . Bid Protest Action Reports
a. The Report Sample
With the assistance of ASN,S&L staff, 159
reports pertaining to the five activities were obtained.
The profile by fiscal year and activity is provided as Table
25. As is apparent, the NAVSUP activities targeted represent
a sizeable sample of the total population of reports, which
is consistent with the theoretical approach taken for this
research.
Only one of the five activities solicited for
data provided these specific reports directly to the re-
searcher. Two activities explicitly withheld the data as
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TABLE 25




Activities 85 86 87 * Totals Totals
ICP
ASO 9 6 - 14 9.4
SPCC 20 25 2 47 29.6
NRCC
Long Beach 14 16 - 30 18.9
Philadelphia 11 20 - 31 19.5
Washington, DC 11 11 11 36 22.6
Column Totals 65 80 14 159
Partial Year Data
Source: ASN Bid Protest Action Reports; compiled by
Researcher
too preliminary. The inference is that one must be cautious
in using the Reports.
The 159 reports obtained consist of 62 reports
from the two ICPs and 97 reports from the three NRCCs.
Specifically, there are 15 from ASO, 47 from SPCC, 30 from
NRCC Long Beach, 31 from NRCC Philadelphia, and 3 6 from NRCC
Washington.
It is not clear to what extent these reports
reflect the total experience of the five activities. The
total number from Long Beach agrees closely with the total
number of protests that they identified to the researcher;
slight variances can be accounted for by differences in
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dating the reports and by lagging reporting to ASN. NRCC
Philadelphia legal staff identified only nine protests of
which all were included in the ASN data. ASO, SPCC AND NRCC
Washington total figures were not available. The
approximate equality among the three NRCCs seems to indicate
that most, if not all, reports are in the ASN data. On the
other hand, the difference between ASO and SPCC leads the
researcher to suspect that some ASO reports may not be in
the sample. Regardless of its completeness, the sample size
is sufficiently large to fairly reflect Navy experience.
Any omissions can be assumed to be random which further
supports the validity of the sample.
In terms of time experience, 65 of the reports
(41%) were FY 85 actions, 145 (50%) were FY 86 records, and
14 (9%) were preliminary FY 87 documents. Viewed from the
lag time inherent in the GAO process, this seems to be
broadly consistent with overall GAO experience.
b. Analysis by Protestors
The 159 Bid Protest Action Reports reflect
protests filed with GAO by 130 separate enterprises. In 110
cases, the protest was the only one submitted by that firm;
20 firms accounted for the remaining 49 protest actions.
Of the 2 protestors involved in more than one
protest, eight protested different solicitations or
contracts. Five of these were to the same contracting
agency while three made separate protests to two agencies.
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The remaining 12 protestors complained about 16
solicitations. On nine occasions two protests were made;
two situations involved three protests; in one instance four
protests were lodged; and in one case five protests were
filed.
Thus, the sample of Bid Protest Reports indicate
a wide range in the number of enterprises involved. Nearly
85% of the firms make only a single protest to GAO. Another
10.8% have filed only twice. Only one firm protested three
solicitations or contracts and none protested more than
that.
In approximately 22.7% of sample solicitations
that were protested firms used the protest system to force
their point by submitting multiple protests. One
interpretation of this is that one in five protestors relies
strongly on the GAO award protest process to enforce their
desires. The other four-fifths do not expend further
resources on the GAO process.
c. Analysis by Issue Stated
The 159 Reports sampled were arranged by issue
areas cited in the report. The issue area categories used
by the researcher are the same ones used by GAO in its
annual reports. Results are shown in Table 26. One problem
in tabulating the results is information missing from some
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issue/no stated issue" category, so that category might be
somewhat inflated to the detriment of another.
We can compare these results to the GAO results
reported in Chapter IV to determine how the sample fared.
The first and most important observation is that allegations
of improper sole source award are over three times as high
as the GAO averages. The bulk of these are at one activity,
SPCC. Five of the seven protests to SPCC citing improper
sole source awards were post-CICA FY 85 actions. SPCC
reported none in FY 8 6 and only two by February 1987.
Except for SPCC, the other activities were close to the GAO
experience. So it is likely that the finding is an anomaly.
Other activities are closer to the GAO norm. The remaining
categories are close to the GAO averages with the exception
that nearly three times as many protests cited selection
methodology problems. This variance may be a consequence of
reporting terminology and the scoring methodology of the
researcher. Several issue descriptions could arguably have
been placed in the "improper rejection of protestors offer"
category, which is somewhat below the GAO average. Overall,
the sample percentages and GAO percentages are reasonably
well aligned, except for the sole source issue noted.
a. Analysis by Protest Outcome
Bid Protest Action Report outcomes were
tabulated. Results are given in Table 27. Only 11.9% of
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protestors view; 1.3% were sustained decisions at GAO and
10.6% resulted in an action that caused the protest to be
withdrawn. Results were unknown in another 5% of the cases,
but even if all of the unknown outcomes were successful, the
sample success rate is still below 17% which indicates that
success before GAO is slightly lower than the GAO averages,
e. Other Sample Data Entries
The quality of the remaining sample report
entries which concern cost incurred and contract delay
varies widely and generally deteriorates so drastically that
further analysis is inhibited.
C. CORRELATION WITH FIELD ACTIVITY CONTRACT DATA
With the assistance of NRCC Long Beach personnel, DD
Form 350 listings of all contracting actions were obtained
for NRCC Long Beach by fiscal years and by contract method.
Using DD 350 data, one should be able to examine commodity
area or other constituent information to determine if any
patterns exist. Sadly, of the 43 post-CICA protests—which
includes protests to the contracting officer and GAO
protests—only 11 could be tracked to DD 350 transactions.
The translation difficulty lies in correlation of
solicitation numbers pertaining to ~he protests and eventual
contract numbers. The two are not uniformly traceable and
in some cases no contract resulted. It is the researcher's
opinion that this obstacle could be overcome, but is beyond
the scope of the present research.
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Of the 11 identifiable transactions, no apparent
patterns developed: several different contract methods and
Federal Supply Codes were involved.
D. CONTRACTING AGENCY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted to sample contracting activity
personnel attitudes and awareness with 19 individuals: five
from each ICP and three from each NRCC. The methodology was
discussed previously in Chapter II. E. The results of the
interviews are summarized below.
1. Experience Level
The individuals interviewed were all warranted
contracting officers. Average experience exceeded 13 years
;
the range of experience spanned a minimum of two years to an
upper limit of 28 years. All but one were supervisors;
about half were first level supervisors and half second-
level managers.
This profile of highly experienced individuals
resulted from the fact that those to be interviewed were
usually identified by senior contracts managers who knew the
minimum experience level the researcher desired;
specifically, individuals whose experience predated CICA.
One interesting comment: was repeated in several
separate interviews: while a good number of people with
high experience levels are available, the experience of
those they supervise is very low. Individuals with
intermediate level experience are in short supply.
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2 . Knowledge of Those Interviewed
Every interviewee except one had at least a working
knowledge of bid protests, the GAO process, and the
Competition in Contracting Act. They can be characterized
as a well-schooled group of practitioners. When asked to
discuss the protest process, most mentioned protests to the
contracting officer and protests to GAO and GSBCA, while
omitting the courts as a forum. About one in five was able
to fully articulate the total award protest process system
(as described in Chapter III) and the features of each forum
without prompting. The majority expressed their knowledge
indirectly by identifying and explaining issues or concerns
rather than by clear, explicit statements. It is the
opinion of the researcher that the shortcomings encountered
do not indicate a lack of knowledge, but rather indicated
varying abilities on the telephone when talking to an
unknown interviewer.
Few outright errors were expressed, but most of the
responders did not know specific details. For example, a
high percentage were aware that an agency response deadline
existed for GAO protests, and many correctly linked it to
CICA changes, but very few stated the correct number of
days. Most stated a range of days or picked a value while
expressing some doubt.
While all of those questioned expressed familiarity
with CICA, their answers to the question regarding how CICA
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changed the protest process (Question #12) varied widely. A
small percentage exhibited a textbook knowledge; the
majority cited only the response deadline and automatic stay




extensive details—fits well with the general perception
that bid protests are exceptional occurrences. All but one
of those interviewed chose exceptional when asked to
characterize protests as routine or exceptional. The
holdout selected "somewhere in between." In clarifying his
remarKs, this interviewee gave a distinct impression that
exceptional was being construed to mean seldom seen rather
than rare. If bid protests are low percentage occurrences,
it makes sense that contracting officers are not overly
familiar with details such as the response deadline time.
3 . Bid Protest Practices
Bid protest practices were fairly uniform. When
faced with a disgruntled offeror or bidder, every one of the
contracting officers stated that they first try to listen
objectively to determine whether a Government mistake has
been made and to fully inform the party of the details
concerning his or her situation. Most felt that the
majority of potential protests could be avoided by dealing
fairly with the would-be protestor at this stage. Many
stated that if a mistake is evident they are guick and
forthright about correcting the matter. Although all would
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answer questions about protest rights, few would volunteer
the information because they believed that it might invite a
frivolous protest in the current post-CICA environment.
Several emphasized that they believe many potential protests
are avoided when the offeror or bidder is made fully aware
of the constraints the contracting officer is under.
Several also mentioned that difficulties arise in a pre-
award situation when dealing with disclosures that could
prejudice the balance of the award.
When faced with a protest to the contracting
officer, a large majority handle the matter at the
contracting officer level but most use legal counsel as
support. All rely on arms length, yet informal processes,
such as review by a supervisor.
Protests to the GAO effectively disengage most
contracting officers; the legal staffs at the field activity
prepare the required report for submission to GAO: the
contracting officer only answers questions and provides
paperwork to the legal staff. None of those interviewed had
a good grasp of the costs involved in terms of dollars or
time for GAO protests and none had been involved personally
in a GAO conference.
Generally little of substance is done differently
from a procedural viewpoint in the post-CICA world.
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4 . Perceptions of Those Interviewed
Approximately two-thirds of those interviewed felt
that the number of protests had increased as a result of
CICA; the others split fairly evenly between beliefs of no
change and decreasing numbers of complaints. Of those who
believe the number of protests are increasing, about half
expressly link the new-found ease of obtaining stay of award
as the cause of the increase.
None of the interviewees considered a bid protest a
black mark against his or her own performance or that of any
of those they supervised. Some did volunteer that if a
pattern of bid protests with valid causes emerges, they
would look for negligence on the part of the contracting
officer. Most expressed the belief that bid protests result
from a variety of causes that are beyond the control of the
contracting officer and therefore, protests are not an
indicator of poor performance.
When questioned about how the prospect of a bid
protest influences their pre-award behavior, nearly all
initially stated that bid protests did not influence them,
yet continued by explaining that they did "second guess"
more frequently and also harbored some increased degree of
concern—thus effectively qualifying their initial "no."
When asked if the possibility of a bid protest intimidated
them, only one interviewee said "yes"; most of the "no"
responses were emphatic. A general trend appeared in the
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discussions at this point: the respondents linked opinions
that protests were facts of "contracting officer life," that
protests are avoided when possible, and stated that the
general defense was to redouble efforts to "do things
right."
Two thoughtful answers include observations that
contracting officers have probably modified their behavior
to include a consideration of appearances before awarding.
Prior to CICA awards were made on the basis of applying
evaluation criteria without much second guessing. Now,
contracting officers are likely to review the evaluation
package after deciding the winner to assess how defensible
the Government position is from the viewpoint of the
unsuccessful offerors as well. A second observer noted that
administrative lead time is increased in this manner in a
very insidious fashion.
An added associated concern of several among the
supervisors interviewed was a general perception that an
inexperienced or untrained contracting work force is not
sensitive to the matters that leave the Government most
vulnerable to protests. Those supervising such staffs feel
a strong need to be more concerned in review solicitations
and control of the work force.
Three interviewees separately warned that urgent
contracting situations are the ones that lead to less
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supportable decisions and consequently to greater protest
susceptibility.
Despite the subtle increase in the level of concern,
none of those interviewed had established new procedures to
cope with their concern. Only one activity had a published
instruction or desk guide concerning handling protests, and
it is severely out-of-date. Furthermore, no added reviews
or cnecklists were oemg used no assuage susceptibility.
Respondents from two activities stated that already existing
review procedures were being given greater emphasis.
Approximately two-thirds of those interviewed stated
that they believed CICA changes had not affected their
behavior, notwitnstanding their previously-stared
ambivalence about the extent of pre-award concern afforded
protest considerations. Many of these individuals stressed r
that CICA did not alter what could be protested, only how
the protest would be processed. The remainder of those
interviewed cited a need to adhere to a renewed disciplined,
up-front effort to avoid such protest and the associated
delays.
The most frequently cited consequence of CICA is an
increased number of protests with a concomitant increase in
frustration and work necessary to resolve the protest.
Several observers stated that they felt CICA indirectly
"tightened up" the entire protest process and that
solicitations are reviewed before release more rigorously
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than prior to CICA. Another observer stated that the
requiring activities are the real losers, especially where
the award of a service contract is delayed and no services
are available while a protest is resolved. A few
interviewees identified each of the following: more delayed
contract awards, increased procurement lead time, and
increased competition due to greater awareness of the
possibility of a protest.
When asked whether the CICA bid protest system is
fairer than its predecessor, about two-thirds responded
affirmatively. They cited the more rigorous system,
especially response times, plus the relative ease of protest
as changes that favor contractors. The other third did not
believe the pre-CICA methods were unfair and saw no
difference. Nearly half of those who felt that CICA changes
improved the system also made the distinction that the
balance scales have swung too far in favor of the protestor.
Their specific complaint is that frivolous protests can stop
the Government procurement process. Most recommend further
legislative change that would differentiate between valid
and malicious protests before a stay is given.
5. Unintended Consequences
None of those interviewed specifically identified
what they felt was an unintended consequence of CICA. It is
however, the researchers opinion that two interviewee's
observations are, in fact, unintended consequences. The
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first is that solicitations may be receiving better quality
control review before release in an effort to avoid
protests. The second is that more attention is paid to the
"appearances" of any tentative award in the final stages of
evaluation. A related matter is the impression of one
observer that unrecognized delays result from this longer
evaluation process.
E. SUMMARY
The purposes for examining field activity level
experience in the post-CICA environment were two-fold:
first, to determine how things have changed as a result of
CICA provisions; and second, to see if any unintended
consequences are apparent. The subsidiary research
questions pertaining to what is the new process and how has
it changed; the extent of exercise of new stay and
termination provisions; behavior of the principals; and
unintended consequences can all be partially answered as a
result of these investigations.
The results of the interviews indicate that the actual
process at the field activity level did not change in terms
of contracting officer protests and did not change
significantly in terms of GAO protests . For all intents and
purposes, the contracting officers are not actors in the GAO
drama; rather they turn their files over to staff lawyers
who handle matters. The impact of CICA is that the response
time from the agencies is directed. The lawyers are the
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ones involved in meeting the deadline, although the
contracting types are consulted to clarify the files.
Stated increases in protests were rarely supported in
personnel experience.
Very few of those interviewed had experienced many post-
CICA GAO protests so they were not in a position to comment
on the number of stays and terminations or the frequency of
such.
The principal change in the behavior of contracting
officers at field activities is an increased sense of being
constrained by the system. Bid protests are not seen as
consequences of mistaken actions that the contracting
officers have taken. Rather, they perceive that bid
protests not only can result but likely will result from a
variety of reasons that are independent from the contracting
officers practices. While the delays and extra,
unproductive workload are to be avoided, the contracting
officer is not responsible if a protest results. The only
loser is the requiring activity which may have to do without
until the matter is resolved.
Although there is a widespread awareness of the so-
called 22-cent protest most have not actually personally
experienced the situation.
In general, the field activities chosen seem to be in
the mainstream of Navy experience, and NAVSUP collectively
is a good representative of overall Navy experience. Navy
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experience in terms of protestors and issues protested agree
reasonably well with average GAO data.
The level of detailed data available at the field
activities is minimal. While one immediate response is to
criticize the lack, it is probably the appropriate amount of
data for events that occur in a small percentage of
instances and which require a tailored reaction when they do
occur. It is not: a good decision to attempt to manage
special events by dedicating scarce resources to
establishing and maintaining seldom used statistics.
Finally, two unintended consequences have been
identified, but their factual existence may be hard to
establish: first, contracts are being reviewed somewhat
more intensively to eliminate protestable matters and
second, the source selection process may have gained an
additional end of selection review step taken to assess the
defensibility of the award as proposed at a cost of
increased lead time.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RESTATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
This research focuses on the CICA-directed bid protest
reform from the perspective of whether the legislation met
its intended purposes. Whether CICA corrected any of the
documented problems with the award process system can also
be assessed by examining the nature of the award protest
process and comparing how it functions before and after the
legislation. The effectiveness of the award protest aspects
of the Competition in Contracting Act can be judged in terms
of the analysis.
The identification of unforeseen consequences that have
resulted from the statutory changes is an important part of
the study. Unintended consequences can be the basis for
further analysis and recommendations.
Lessons learned that are of practical interest to
contracting officers and contractors were also sought.
Another practical aspect is that the study can contribute to
a more extensive literature database.
3. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
1. Increased Number of Protests
Based on analyses using a variety of forecasting
techniques, the number of initial and total protests appear
to have increased marginally by 10-15% over the levels that
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would have been expected otherwise. The number of protests
received at GAO—both initial and total protests—increased
dramatically in FY 85, both before and after CICA, while FY
86 numbers were less than FY 85 but greater than FY 84.
Much of the FY 85 spike appears to be an anomaly which may
be related to the concurrent effects of CICA and
introduction of the FAR. Furthermore, the percentage of
reconsideration requests has doubled.
An increase in protests cannot be considered
surprising in the face of Congressional intentions to
enhance greater usage of the GAO process. However, by
directing GAO to advertise its bid protest process anew and
offering automatic stays and terminations, Congress may have
indirectly invited additional protests by implying to would-
be protestors that some new, more lenient basis for protests
had been enacted. In fact, the changes enacted in CICA do
not substantively alter what may be protested—only the
procedures by which the protests are processed. This line
of reasoning is consistent with an increase in requests for
reconsideration. Also, field activity personnel have
encountered a greater number of protests regarding matters
that exceed the previous norms for protest. Therefore,
while rhe increases in numbers of new protests are not
surprising, the cause of the increase is different from what




The reasons stated in GAO award protests have not
changed in a definite manner as a result of CICA. There is
no evidence among the award protests filed with the
Comptroller General that the percentage of complaints
alleging improper sole source award has increased. In fact,
this issue is given only in approximately 2.5% of protests,
a statistic unchanged with CICA.
The primary, stated purpose of CICA award protest
reform was to enforce additional competition in Federal
contracting by allowing those excluded from sole source
contracts to file protests. The unchanged behavior of
protestors indicates that this intent of CICA has not been
successful. However, contracting agency actions may have
neutralized the provision. General agency response to CICA
has been a major shift to competition along with a dramatic
reduction in sole source contracting. It is impossible to
determine what effect the threat of a protest may have had
on the agency decisions to compete such contracts rather
than risk protest of a sole source award. To the extent
that contracting agencies vacated abuse of sole source
contracting, the reasons for protesting sole source awards
have diminished.
3 Protest Fairness Results Mixed
The other reasons for altering the bid protest
process were to correct a longstanding omission of
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authorization to GAO and to make the process more equitable
by gaining speedy decisions and providing effective
remedies. By dictating a firm response time to contracting
agencies and by providing GAO the authority to dismiss
protests lacking merit, the overall caseload has been
handled in a much more effective fashion. Overall case
disposition rime has decreased by a factor of three, and
developed cases are resolved in half the time needed prior
to CICA. Obviously, this reduced time affords a much fairer
treatment of a valid protest. The majority cf post-CICA
cases are also being resolved before contract award, which
corrects the pre-CICA problem of reduced remedies. However,
the change has been at the cost of unmeasured contract
delays and requiring activity inconvenience that results
from the stays and terminations encountered. The same stay
and termination features that provide the desireable result
also permit an arbitrary, or frivolous protest to bring
Government procurement to a halt. It is difficult to
determine the average procurement time incurred for such
protests, as they are not specifically identifiable.
4 . Protest Outcomes Unaltered
Protest outcomes have not changed significantly in
consequence of CICA, although there may be a slight increase
in the number of cases heard on the merits. On average, 25%
of initial protests filed will be resolved by withdrawal.
About half the withdrawals are due to agency corrective
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action. Another 50% are resolved without decision on the
merits of the protest—most will be dismissed by either a
notice decision or a summary decision. The remaining 25%
are decided on the merits, but only a small minority will be
decided for the protestor. On average, only 7-8% of
protests filed will be sustained. There is no evidence that
CICA has affected this percentage. Combining the cases
withdrawn due to agency corrective actions and cases
sustained gives a net protestor effectiveness percentage in
•che 20% range, i.e., approximately one protest in five will
satisfy the protestor. GAO uses a measure called protestor
effectiveness rate to measure the same protestor success,
but the GAO estimate is slightly higher and it cannot be
derived form the data they report routinely.
5. Length of Time for Legislation to Be Enacted
One interesting conclusion is that it takes a very
long period for rather esoteric changes such as the bid
protest recommendations contained in the COGP Report to gain
a consensus support enabling approval as law. Almost 12
years elapsed between COGP recommendations and the CICA.
Sadly, the recommendations of COGP were implemented in a
piecemeal fashion which may have compromised the results.
6
.
Award Protest System Fragmentation
The award protest system described herein is
fragmented, overlapping in areas, and ill-defined in many
others. Procedures for protest to the contracting officer
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vary widely among agencies without reason. The two
administrative forums—contracting officer and GAO—are not
coordinated. Protestors can use both forums and nuances
exist that make the system confusing, such as the 10 day
time allowed to file a protest to GAO runs regardless of
whether a protest has been filed with the agency. The
discontinuities make the system confusing and cumbersome.
7
.
Contracting Officer Knowledge of the Protest Process
During the course of interviews to determine
contracting officer attitudes toward and awareness of CICA
at field activities, it was strongly evident that the
overwhelming majority of contracting officers interviewed
had a superior general knowledge of the bid protest forums
and the issues involved with the CICA changes. Working
knowledge of details was not quite so complete, but it was
consistent with normal contracting officer involvement and
can be considered more than adequate to accomplish the
contracting agency role.
8. Contracting Officer Behavior Unchanged
In general terms, contracting officer behavior has
not changed observably in direct response to CICA. Any
changes that have occurred are subtle. Business is
conducted as it was before. Protests remain exceptional
matters that occur in a small number of contract situations
for reasons that may or may not be a result of the
contracting officer's activity. While these field activity
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personnel have a healthy attitude regarding considering the
complaint, correcting agency errors when found, and avoiding
protests when possible, they are not intimidated by the new
GAO process and have not established new or modified
existing explicit contracting procedures in response to the
legislation.
9. Use of New Stay and Termination Provisions
Exact use of the new stay and termination provisions
of CICA is difficult to determine, however it has been a
factor in at least the 8% of cases previously received
before and decided after award that are now decided before
award. Stay and termination provisions also affect cases
received and decided before award, but the extent of the
effect is not presently known.
10. Award Protest Management
Generally, there are no management control standards
for the award protest process. GAO statistics reporting
award protests are either workload measures that justify the
size of the GAO legal staff or a measures of how the
contracting agency compare with one another. The only
performance measures involved are disposition times that are
monitored to assure statutory compliance.
Within DOD, comparable statistics are apparently
poorly kept at best. Since no one presently manages DOD
statistics, it is safe to assume that no one in DOD truly
manages award protests for such matters as trend
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identification or process control. Because the field
activities treat protests in a reflexive manner, they do not
even bother to accumulate the statistics they report to
higher agencies and the higher agencies do not apparently
use the reported information.
11. Unforeseen Consequences
Two unintended results of the legislation have been
identified in this research. First, the contracting
activities may be dedicating increased attention to
solicitations to assure that they are less subject to
protests. If this were limited only to assuring the quality
of the solicitation, it would be an unqualified beneficial
result. However, in an environment where contracting
officers believe that protestors have license to protest at
will, without justifiable basis, it is likely that some of
the scrutiny is being wasted on matters of appearances
rather than substance and that some waste of resources is
occurring. Second, contracting officers may be spending
unwarranted efforts on reviewing the appearances of their
decision methods after the fact. This is also a waste of




The problem described herein relating to the shift
of the burden of proof from the protestor to the Government
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which resulted from the CICA language has been identified
and criticized by many, including staff personnel working
with the appropriate Congressional Committees. The matter
can be easily resolved by amending the CICA language to
empower GAO to authorize stay of award rather than making it
automatic. GAO can readily determine whether such a stay is
advisable and stays resulting from protests lacking merit on
their face can be avoided.
2
.
Integrate the Administrative Forums
Congress should direct OFPP to recommend changes to
the present award protest system that would standardize the
procedure for protests to the contracting officer among the
agencies and would integrate the contracting officer and GAO
protest forums to eliminate overlap and inconsistencies.
For example, if OFPP required that protests be filed first
with the agencies, all of the withdrawals that occur due to
corrective agency action would be eliminated. Similarly,
the costs incurred by contractors for double filing to both
agency and GAO could be avoided.
3. Modify GAO Data Reporting
GAO should modify its report data to differentiate
between protests of competitive proposal method contracts to
distinguish between contracts awarded where competition
exists from these awarded under other than full and open
competition. This added information would assist in
dispelling the errant notion that bid protests are a
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competition enforcement means and might provide insight into




Agency Reports to ASN Should Be Used
Given that the data requirement already exists and
is being met to a greater or lesser degree by the field
activities, the data should be accumulated and put to use.
If ASN reported back the summary data of all reporting
activities, activities could compare their experience to
experience of similar organizations. Field activities could
then track their own performance to assay trends and senior
contracting managers could use such summary data to
determine overall contracting performance, to identify
problems or trends and to initiate corrective actions.
5. Field Activities Should Manage Award Protest
Activity
Field activities presently report data to higher
level organizations. They should accumulate and use the
data that they presently export to manage their award
protest activity. The logical group within each
organization to perform this summarization task is the legal
staff, who presently accomplish the balance of the GAO
procedure anyway. However, senior contracting managers
should be monitoring their levels of protests, protest
issues, and overall success to determine how protests might
be more effectively avoided in the future.
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D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The subsidiary research questions will be answered first
in an attempt to build on the answers to address the primary
question.
What causes precipitated the changes found in the CICA?
The changes to the GAO bid protest process contained in
CICA resulted as a byproduct of efforts to restore
competition to Federal contracting after a long period of
decline during which directed procurements had been the
staple of contracting. GAO was given authority to hear
protests, new disposition deadline were established for both
agencies and GAO, and automatic stay and termination
provisions were included almost as an afterthought.
The basis for reform of the award protest system had
been on the agenda since the 1972 COGP Report. The award
protest system investigated in the 1970 time frame by COGP
consisted of three processes: contracting agency, GAO and
judicial. The three processes originated separately and
were so poorly integrated that the Study Group members
considered the system "unfair and ineffective." Three major
problems were cited: absence of procedures and remedies
that assure fairness; delays in processing protests; and
lack of a plan to reduce the number of protests. COGP cited
an underlying lack of a comprehensive, coordinated, and
integrated scheme that would unify the overall system in a
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manner that would assure fair and equitable treatment for
all protestors.
What were the primary objectives regarding the bid
protest process that can be found in the CICA and have they
been achieved?
The objectives of the CICA changes match the causes
summarized above. First, CICA was intended to provide an
enforcement tool to Government contractors to force agencies
to comply with the competition dictates of the legislation.
Second, the legislation served as a vehicle to clean off the
old agenda of protest reform that survived from COGP
recommendations
.
What is the new bid protest process and to what extent
did it actually change from pre-CICA procedures?
The post-CICA bid protest process has nearly the same
procedures as its pre-CICA predecessor. The only
significant changes are the deadlines established for agency
and GAO actions, the new right to dismiss unworthy protests
at an earlier stage, and some of the remedies available to
GAO, specifically the right to award bid proposal costs and
attorney fees.
The changes have been compliance with the directed
times; overall average case disposition times have been cur
by two-thirds and developed case disposition time is cut in
half. GAO has used the dismissal power with a vengeance
which is reflected in the total disposition time. The
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average number of cases decided before award had increased
and presumably the range of remedies available to GAO has
been broadened thereby increasing process fairness.
One fundamental change that may or may not have been
fully understood by the legislators is the shift of burden
of proof from the protestor to the Government which results
from the automatic stay and termination provisions of the
legislation. This has resulted in delays that are not
readily calculable.
What are the principal management control standards of
the bid protest process and what changes do these measures
reflect?
GAO reports a wide range of statistics that measure the
GAO protest process, but it is incorrect to consider them
management control standards. More realistically, the
number of protests arise from overall Government contract
activity and practices and GAO responds. This is the same
at the field activities surveyed. None of the activities
manages the protest process; few even bother to accumulate
data on the amount of resources they expend dealing with
protests.
The GAO statistics do provide sufficient information to
assess that the level of total and initial protests
increased by 10-15% at the time of CICA, case disposition
times fell dramatically, and case decision ratios remained
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largely unchanged. These data are the evidence of the
impact of CICA.
To what extent have the new stay and termination
provisions been exercised?
The increase in the percentage of cases resolved before
award is approximately 8%. All of these cases are affected
by the stay provision. Additionally, some percentage of the
cases received and decided before award are affected
differently than prior to CICA, yet it is difficult to
assess how many and how significant the influence has been.
This question remains largely unanswered.
Has the behavior of the principal entities involved in
the process changed as a consequence of CICA?
During the course of the personnel survey, it was
established that contracting officer behavior has not been
affected in an obvious externally observable factor.
However, a level of frustration and disassociation is
apparent and a few of those interviewed identified rather
subtle ways in which contracting officer behavior may have
changed. Specifically, the contracting officers may be
taken greater measures to avoid bid protest and the
concomitant delays inherent in the GAO forum by avoiding
situations they believe are susceptible to protest. To the
extent that these activities are nonproductive, they are an
undesirable, and unforeseen outcome of the legislation.
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Have there been any unintended consequences of the CICA
bid protest modifications?
Two possible unintended consequences were identified:
first, added review measures to delete protestable matters
from solicitations and added post-evaluation review to
assure award criteria were defensible after application.
The actual causal relationship of these unintended
consequences of CICA would be very difficult to prove in a
clear fashion.
Primary Research Question: What has been the impact of
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 on the bid
protest process?
The primary intent of CICA to serve as an enforcement,
mechanism to assure greater competitive procurement has not
been exercised. If the measure had any effect, it was in
the form of a threat that the agencies chose to avoid.
As a reformation of the award protest process, the CICA
changes have only been partially effective. The GAO forum
is undoubtedly faster and a greater number of protests are
being resolved before award, so more equitable treatment can
be assumed. However, the change has been at the cost of
unmeasured contract delays and requiring activity
inconvenience that results from the stays and terminations
encountered. Overall, the total system which consists of
three forums remains fragmented, confusing, and less than
efficient.
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E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The term "interested party" is used by GAO as a word of
art and it is defined in CICA. However, GAO has interpreted
the phrase in various ways in its case decisions to include
or exclude 'stockholders, subcontractors, outside parties,
and others. It would be of interest to compile the various
GAO case decisions interpretations to achieve a clearer
description. Such a clear description could be published to
provide contractors with a better understanding of when they
have standing to file.
The GAO routinely refuses to hear issues that relate to
Small Business size and status and matters under Department
of Labor cognizance. The fact that protests continue to be
sent to GAO indicates a problem exists. This area could be
investigated further.
Finally, the Bid Protest Action Report files at ASN
could be examined in greater detail to determine if the data
reported in the entire file is consistent with the results
of the survey analyzed in this research.
F. SUMMARY
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 has resulted
in rather dramatic changes in Federal procurement on the
large scale; but it has had less impact in terms of
correcting award protest problems. In fact, the remedy has
gained improvement in terms of faster disposition and fairer
remedies at the expense of increased contract delays. In
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some indeterminate number of cases, the delays are incurred
without a good reason which serves to increase the level of
frustration of the contracting officers and the requiring
activities. Further amendments to the law are needed to
rectify this problem. Additionally, there may be rather












Introduction: This is a telephone interview regarding the
bid protest process and contracting officer attitudes
towards it. May I ask you a few questions?
1. WhaTi is your experience in contracting?
[Does contracting experience predate CICA, i.e., January
1935?]
2. Would you describe the bid pretest process to me?
Key points addressed: Protest to KO
Protest to GAO/GSBCA?.
Protest to Courts
Do you describe this process to contractors in the
course of routine practice? If so, when?
Have you personnally experienced a bid protest?
If so, was the protest successful?
Are bid protests increasing or decreasing in frequency
at your organization?
What do you do when a dissatisfied contractor calls to
complain either before or after award?
Do you advise him of his rights to protest?
Do you assure them that the transaction was fair?
Do you seek legal help?
What, do you do when notified of a bid protest:?
Do wruten procedures exist? If so when were they
written and implemented?
Who handles KO protests, you or your supervisor?
Are bid protests considered a routine or exceptional
situation?
Are bid protests considered a black mark against your
performance?
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How long does it take your organization to respond to
the GAO?
Do you have any feel for hours or cost involved in
preparing a response?
Does your organization participate in GAO conferences
with the protestor?
10. Does the prospect of a bid protest influence your pre-
award behavior? If so, how? Intimidation? Degree of
concern? Indifference?
11. Do you take any special measures in setting up your
contracts to avoid potential bid protests? Legal
review? Special checklists? If so, when did you start
these procedures?
12. Are you familiar with the Competition in Contracting Act





13. Has CICA affected your behavior to bid protests?
14
.
What do you see as the consequences of CICA?
Checkpoints: Increased/decreased no of protests
Better K QA before release
Increased PALT
Additional paperwork
Added reviews in legal
Other
15. Do you believe that CICA changes made the bid protest
system more fair than it was?
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